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INTRODUCTION 
The deterioration in the quality of the loan portfolio of banks was the main cause of problems 
in the banking system and in financial crisis in developed economies. Indeed, the increase in 
loan defaults underlines the links between macroeconomic and financial shocks and the 
relationship between the friction in the credit market and the risk of financial instability. 
Moreover, the fact that loan performance is tightly linked to the economic cycle is well 
known and not surprising: average bank assets quality deteriorated sharply due to the global 
economic recession of 2007-2008.  
 
Therefore, addressing non-performing loans within the European banking system is one of the 
key priorities of the ECB’s supervisory work. In particular, European supervisors generally 
consider a loan to be non-performing when there are indicators that the borrower is unlikely to 
repay the loan owing to financial difficulties or if more than 90 days have passed without the 
borrower paying the agreed instalments 
For the European Commission, implementation and enforcement of a banking union within 
the eurozone is a key priority, with strong multinational teams concentrated at the European 
Central Bank (ECB). In this context, non-performing loans represent a real challenge for bank 
profitability and financial stability. NPLs also constrain credit expansion and delay economic 
recovery. A series of options have been suggested with a view to improving conditions in the 
European NPL market and reinforcing investor confidence respecting at the same time state 
aid rules. Public intervention measures, as it is reported in the first chapter, such as asset 
management companies and other co-investment strategies are considered necessary to 
increase the market efficiency and to create a virtuous cycle of reductions in the volume of 
NPLs.  
After the financial crisis, bank supervision has mainly focused on large banks, as also 
remarked by the European Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) which involves only the 
114 biggest banks operating in the Euro area. As I will better explain, patterns of non-
performing loan developments have nonetheless varied significantly across member states, 
reflecting different problems and cycles in national banking systems (Schuler et al., 2015). 
Therefore the euro area countries that were relatively more hurt by the debt crisis (Cyprus, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain) experienced substantial increases in the 
NPL ratios since 2010, lasting until recently, when the NPL trend started to decrease.     
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This study addresses a key policy relevant question: did the introduction of the BRRD have 
an effect on the stock of non-performing of the supervised entities by the ECB and so the 
SSM? 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. 
Chapter 1 analyzes one of the most important directives introduced in 2014 in the euro zone 
but adopted by the member states in 2015, that is the Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive, and a shot description of other European supervisory directives introduced in the 
past decade with a brief overview of the related literature. The harmonized definitions of the 
European Banking Authority tried to give a supranational framework in the European Union, 
in order to get an easier picture and comparison of the state members.   
Chapter 2 focuses on the econometric methodology that is applied for quantifying the 
relationship between the annual growth of non-performing loans and the macro and micro 
financial determinants. The most suitable approach is panel data model, with different 
estimations and specifications in order to capture all the relevant interactions between the 
variables.  
Chapter 3 presents a comprehensive description of the dataset and gives a track of the relevant 
variables affecting the stock of NPLs and the role of the European Directive (BRRD). As 
independent variables, both bank-specific (gross loans, loan loss provisions, Tier 1 ratio and 
coverage ratio) and macro-economic (real GPD growth, inflation rate and judicial efficiency) 
factors are included in the analysis. Creating a panel of significant banks in the euro area 
according to the ECB, the observations starts in 2011 until 2017.  
Chapter 4, the last part of the analysis, reports the empirical results of different econometric 
specifications, highlighting the statistically significance of the European directive and the 
relevance of the annual growth of real GDP as macro factor. In particular, the results will 
show that the introduction of the BRRD played a role in reducing the annual growth of the 
stock of non-performing loans, that is the dependent variable. Whereas between the bank-
specific variables, only the annual growth of gross loans has a statistically significance and 
positive relation with the dependent variable.  
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CHAPTER 1 – THE ROLE OF BRRD IN THE NPL 
RESOLUTION 
1.1 The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BBRD)  
The global financial crisis, starting in 2007-2009, is still being processed by many economies. 
It was not clear how to react to a distressed banking sector and serious weaknesses in the tools 
available to deal with failing banks without interrupting the provision or systematically 
critical functions to customers and to the whole economy. In other words, the financial crisis 
has brought to light many weaknesses in global financial systems, including the threat to 
financial stability posed by banks that were too big, interconnected and complex to be closed 
or go bankrupt. As a result, many banks have been rescued with public support but basically 
shifting their losses to taxpayers of bank owners or investors. Together with higher capital 
and liquidity requirements, the enhancement of resolution regimes was a central element of 
the international regulatory response to increase bank resilience. The Key Attributes of the 
Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions by the Financial Stability Board 
(endorsed by the G20 in 2011) gave the new harmonized international standard for resolution 
regimes for financial institutions: the KA serve as guidance for jurisdictions that are adopting 
national resolution regimes.  
Within the European Union, more than 40 legislative and non-legislative measures were 
adopted after the financial crisis: the EU was a forerunner in implementing the KA especially 
in terms of bail-in tool. A new framework for dealing with failing banks, the Bank Recovery 
and Resolution Directive (BRRD), was agreed in 2014 for national implementation as of 
January 2015. It translates the KA in the EU context and provides for a harmonized 
framework and enhanced cooperation for bank resolution in the EU, building on other EU 
legislations, such as the capital adequacy requirements for banks, the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (DGSD), and EU 
state aid rules, as a basis and potential game-changer in creating a more stable and fairer 
banking system. The objective of the new post-crisis resolution framework is essentially 
regulating how banks should be organized. Moreover it provides the instruments that should 
be in place to preserve overall financial stability while reducing the costs of a failed 
systematically important bank for sovereigns and tax-payers.  
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The BRRD regulates the several stages and elements of a problem bank recovery and 
resolution process, including advanced planning and restructuring (World Bank, 2017). The 
key elements of the BRRD are the following:  
• Recovery and resolution planning including the removal of obstacles to resolvability;  
• A stronger set of early intervention measures to foster forward looking supervision and 
crisis prevention; 
• A harmonized set of resolution tools and powers to manage bank failure, aiming to 
ensure that losses are absorbed by shareholders and creditors while allowing the 
continuity of critical functions.  
 
In particular, according to Article 37-44 of the BRRD, the four main resolution tools are:  
1) bail-in tool, ensuring that losses are absorbed by shareholders and creditors, allows the 
resolution authority to allocate incurred losses to the owners and debt holders of the 
institution;  
2) sale of business tool, allowing the resolution authority to sell all or part of the failing 
bank to a private acquirer, allows for a swift transfer of shares, assets, rights and 
liabilities of the institution under resolution to a purchaser “on commercial terms”; 
3) bridge institution tool: transferring the good assets and essential functions of the 
problem bank into a new temporary institution (bridge bank) with the aim of selling it; 
4) the asset separation tool1: isolating the “bad” assets of the bank into an asset 
management vehicle (also known as a “bad bank”) for orderly wind down, if 
immediate liquidation is not justified in current market conditions and so it allows for 
a value improving workout of assets and avoids possible value destruction caused by 
the liquidation. 
 
In addition, government stabilization tools (which are technically defined as resolution tools) 
may be used as a last resort in the extraordinary situation of systemic crisis and after having 
exploited all resolution tools. The resolution authority may seek funding from the government 
either by way of temporary public ownership or public equity support.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Article 42(5) of the BRRD limits the use of the asset separation tool: it might be only used if, under normal 
insolvency proceedings, the liquidation of the assets could have an adverse effect on one or more financial 
markets.  
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The BRRD is adopted in spring 2014 to provide authorities with:  
• comprehensive and effective arrangements to deal with failing banks at national level;  
• cooperation arrangements to manage cross-border banking failures.  
 
The directive requires banks to prepare recovery plans against financial distress. It also grants 
national authorities’ powers to ensure an orderly resolution of failing banks with minimal 
costs for taxpayers. 
The directive includes rules to set up a national resolution fund that must be established by 
each EU country and all financial institutions have to contribute to these funds: contributions 
are calculated on the basis of the institution’s size and risk profile. Moreover, the European 
Union bank resolution rules ensure that the shareholders of the bank and creditors pay their 
share of the costs through a “bail-in” mechanism. If that is still not enough, the national 
resolution funds can provide the resources needed to ensure that a bank operating while it is 
being restructured.  
A bank resolution takes place when authorities determine that a failing bank cannot go 
through normal insolvency proceedings without harming public interest and causing financial 
instability. To manage the bank failure in an orderly manner, authorities use resolution tools 
that ensure continuity of the bank critical functions, maintain financial stability and restore the 
viability of parts of all the bank.  
As it will be specified in the next part, after the financial crisis, the European Union adopted 
many measures to harmonize and improve the tools for dealing with bank crisis in its member 
countries. 
Especially, the BRRD resolution toolkit is applied only if justified by public interest, that is to 
systematically importan. The BRRD does not regulate bankruptcy or insolvency law which 
remain in the national competence as an alternative to resolution. This directive is the 
outcome of a long negotiation process: the new bank recovery and resolution framework has 
several far reaching implications, both within the EU but also for countries having relations 
with the EU.  
The directive promotes a forward-looking approach to supervision, with early and timely 
intervention measures, the removal of impediments to resolution under going concern 
ensuring that an entity is actually “resolvable”, when circumstances require. By making 
failure possible, directive aims at reducing the need for public support, boosting sustainable 
market economies and creating positive effects for civil society. Furthermore, by removing 
the implicit government guarantee, it also helps to increase banks accountability towards their 
costumers, clients and investors encouraging better risk management and financial strength. 
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As such, the BRRD serves as a robust benchmark for cohesion among countries and the wider 
Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region.  
 
The SSM and the supervised entities 
Before formally taking on its responsibilities in November 2014, the ECB conducted a 
“comprehensive assessment”.  The assessment includes two main pillars for banks falling 
under its mandate, in preparation of the launch of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM):  
1) an asset quality review (AQR) held between 2013 and 2014: to improve the 
transparency of bank exposures including the adequacy of asset and collateral 
valuation and related provisions (the accuracy of loan classification in the 
performing and non-performing); 
2) a stress-test: to test the resilience of bank balance sheet (in cooperation with the 
European Banking Authority), it was conducted with reference to a baseline and an 
adverse macroeconomic scenario.  
Of the 130 largest banks, 25 banks were found to have capital shortfall.  
The SSM delivers prudential supervision led by the EBC as the supervisor of financial 
institutions in the euro area, together with the national supervisory authorities of the 
participating member states. As of July 2019, 114 “significant” banks (or SI, significant 
institutions) are under the ECB’s direct supervision, representing approximately 82% of euro 
area bank assets2.  
 
In 2015, the ECB decided to take a further step in the management of bad loans with the 
publication of the “Guidance to banks on non-performing loans” in March 2017. The 
document established several measures to deal with this issue, and to clarify the supervisory 
expectations regarding the identification, management, measurement and write-off of NPLs in 
the context of existing regulations, directives and guidelines. The Guidance stressed the 
importance of timely provisioning and write-off practices related to NPLs in order to 
strengthen bank balance sheets. 
 
In October 2017, the Guidance was complemented by a draft “Addendum to the ECB 
Guidance”, in order to reinforce the practices. This Addendum specifies the supervisory 
expectations of the ECB when assessing the level of prudential provisions for NPLs of banks.  
In the SSM Framework Regulation, the types of supervised banks are referred to as:  
                                                 
2 According to Article 49(1) of Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the ECB (ECB/2014/17). 
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• credit institutions established in participating Member States; 
• financial holding companies established in participating Member States; 
• mixed financial holding companies established in participating Member States; 
• branches established in participating Member States by credit institutions established 
in non-participating Member States. 
 
De Nederlandsche Bank and the Bank of England have the responsibility for other European 
banks, because they are defined as National Resolution Authorities (NRAs) by the BRRD.  
Moreover, a close collaboration between the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and the 
NRAs is required and will be based on a cooperation framework3, with the SRM’s own 
Internal Resolution4.  
 
What makes a bank significant? 
The criteria for determining whether banks are considered significant, and therefore under the 
ECB’s direct supervision, are set out in the SSM Regulation and the SSM Framework 
Regulation. The ECB can decide at any time to classify a bank as significant to ensure that 
high supervisory standards are applied consistently. To qualify as significant, banks must 
fulfill at least one of the folllowing criteria. 
 
Figure 1.1: Significance criteria.  
 
Source: ECB Banking Supervision. 
 
                                                 
3 To be approved under Article 31(1) of the SRM regulation.  
4 Any Single Resolution Board (SRB) decision will be implemented by the NRAs.     
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Nowadays, with the establishment of the SSM, the ECB and the national supervisors have 
developed a common approach for collecting data from the European banking sector: the 
framework for reporting have been developed by the European Banking Authority (EBA).  
The status of banks may change: either through normal business activity or due to one-off 
events such as merges or acquisitions. In these cases, the ECB and the national supervisors 
involved coordinate the transfer of supervisory responsibilities5.  
 
Other activities at European level addressing the problem of NPLs 
In addition to the ECB and the related SSM, other European institutions took a step forward 
the resolution and the management of these bad loans. First, the European Parliament in the 
Annual Report on the Banking Union 2016, published in 2017, was worried about the high 
level of NPLs and suggested to reduce it in some European members. The European 
Parliament also indicated the Commission as assistant in the establishment of dedicated asset 
management companies (“bad banks”). They requested that European economies revised their 
legislation, with particular attention to the length of recovery procedures, the functioning of 
judicial system and the legal framework concerning the restructuring of debt.  
 
In 2016, the European Parliament has claimed that the high level of NPLs on bank balance 
sheets in the Banking Union weighs on their ability to lend to the real economy because of 
their impact on profitability, funding costs, and bank capital (European Parliament, 2016).  
In fact, banks having weaker balance sheets tend to lend less, because they are less profitable 
and so weaker capital buffers, facing higher funding costs. This phenomenon has implication 
also on the monetary transmission, as credit supply remains heavily influenced by the lending 
behavior of banks, due to the dominance of bank lending in the corporate sector finance in 
Europe.  
 
In the meanwhile, in July 2017, the Council decided to make an action plan6 to manage the 
problem of NPLs in the banking sector explaining a set of policy actions in order to reduce the 
level of non-performing loans7. The document established the reciprocal actions of the banks, 
member states and the whole European Union, encouraging the Commission to deal with 
NPLs and the relative risks (European Commission, 2018).   
                                                 
5 The ECB conducts regular reviews of all banks authorized within the participating countries. 
6 The so called “Action plan to tackle non-performing loans in Europe” of 11 July 2017.   
7 Based on the recommendations in its Financial Services Committee report.  
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Also, the European Commission with the Commission reflection paper of 31 May 2017 
suggested a strategy for the non-performing loans in the European Union, defining NPLs “one 
of the most damaging legacies of the crisis”, which would not stop weigh on the performance 
of the banking sector and a source of potential fragility. In October 2017, the European 
Commission announced that a comprehensive package of measures would be established by 
spring 2018 (European Parliament, 2018):  
1) a blueprint for how national AMC can be built up; 
2) measures to expand the secondary markets for NPLs;  
3) measures to improve the protection of the creditors;  
4) a benchmarking exercise of loan enforcement regimes to better display the delays and 
value-recovery banks experience when borrowers default;  
5) a report on the possible introduction of minimum levels of provisioning for future 
NPLs; 
6) a proposal to promote the transparency on NPLs by improving the data availability.  
 
Then, in March 2018, the European Commission presented the set of measures to deal with 
the high stock of NPLs, proposing a regulation on a minimum loss coverage for new non-
performing exposures: first, a requirement for institutions to cover up to common minimum 
levels the expected losses on new loans when they turn non-performing and second, when this 
minimum coverage requirement is not satisfied, a deduction of the difference between the 
level of actual coverage and the minimum coverage from CET18 items is applied.  
 
Overall, ECB has maintained the credit risk area among the SSM priorities for 2019, resulting 
in continuing pressure to achieve consistent coverage of the stock of non-performing exposure 
(NPE) in the medium term. Calendar provisioning included in the ECB Addendum will 
require an impairment equal to 100% of the new flows of NPE in 2/7 years for 
unsecured/secured exposures. In other words, the Addendum specifies the minimum levels of 
prudential provisions from January 2018: banks are expected to provide full coverage for the 
unsecured portion of new NPLs (loans originated before January 2018 because they become 
non-performing after that date) within 2 years (7 years for secured portions). The ECB also 
stated that “it is immaterial whether the delays in realizing the security were due to reasons 
                                                 
8 The Common Equity Tier 1 ratio (CET1), pure equity as a percentage of risk-weighted assets, is a measure of 
bank solvency and the effective minimum for European banks under Basel III is 4.5%, even if it was first 
introduced in 2014 as a precautionary means to protect the economy. It consists mostly of common stock held by 
a bank or financial institution.   
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beyond the bank control (e.g. length of time it takes to conclude legal proceedings)” (ECB, 
(2017), page. 10).  
 
1.2 Non-performing loan (NPL) definition  
There is no global definition of non-performing loans. Anyway, to reduce uncertainty in the 
NPL issues, the EBA has proposed harmonized forbearance and non-performing exposures 
definitions to apply to all loans and debt securities on-balance-sheet. The first EU-wide 
application of the harmonized definition of NPL was in 2014 for the AQR exercise. In 
October 2013, the EBA released two definitions as amendments of the common EU-wide 
IFRS Supervisory reporting framework (FINREP): the definition of forbearance (FBE) and 
the definition of non-performing exposures (NPE). Following the financial and sovereign 
crisis in the EU, concerns raised about the forbearance policies and non-performing exposures 
management across the EU, and in addition, various national and bank definitions led to 
missing comparability of reported figures for forbearance and non-performing exposures. This 
situation called for a single definition within the EU.  
 
In particular, according to the EBA definitions, forbearance measures are concessions towards 
a debtor facing or about to face financial difficulties (loan, debt securities, commitments, with 
no trading exposure). Forbearance measures may or may not lead to a loss upon application: 
exposures do not need to be non-performing/past-due for a modification/refinancing to qualify 
as forbearance when granted. The exposure is performing and no other exposure to the debtor 
is more than 30 days past-due, or two years have passed since the date the exposure has been 
considered as performing.  
A non-performing exposure (NPE), instead, is an exposure that is:  
1) 90 days past-due (material exposure) or unlikely to be repaid in full without collateral 
realization (irrespective of any past-due amount or of the number of days past-due),  
2) impaired or defaulted according to the applicable accounting or regulatory 
frameworks.  
Given that the use of different NPL definitions (and different accounting procedures) made it 
difficult to compare the situation in different Member States, the EBA initiated a uniform 
definition of NPEs which banks are encouraged to use. 
Exposures can be non-performing on an individual or debtor basis but all exposures to a 
debtor are non-performing when on-balance sheet exposures more than 90 days past-due is 
greater than 20% of the on-balance sheet exposures to the debtor. A common understanding 
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of these two concepts leads to a better comparison of the credit quality of portfolios across 
banks and countries. Moreover this EBA definition allowed to draw the same line for all 
institutions between performing and non-performing exposures. 
These definitions match the principles established in 2004 by the Basel II Acord, where 
defaulted exposures had to meet the objective criterion (some minimum delay in payments), 
the subjective criterion (the obligator being unlikely to pay in full) or both.  
 
According to the European Parliament, non-performing loans are usually defined as loans that 
are either more than 90 days past-due, or unlikely to be repaid in full, taking into account both 
the debtor’s past and the future performance. The classification of loans as non-performing is 
done independently of whether the debtor has provided collateral for the loan. Non-
performing loans and non-performing exposures are usually used interchangeably in the 
documentations of the European authorities.  
Specifically, according to the European Central Bank (ECB), when customers do not meet 
their agreed repayment arrangements for 90 days or more, the bank must set aside more 
capital on the assumption that the loan will not be paid back. This reduces the capacity to 
provide new loans. Moreover, if a bank has too many bad loans on its balance sheet, its 
profitability will suffer because it will no longer earn enough money from its credit business. 
In addition, bank will need to put money aside to safety net in case it needs to write off the 
full amount of the loan at some point in time. In the worst-case scenario, the borrower is 
completely unable to repay the loan and the bank needs to correct the value of the loan on its 
balance sheet, sometimes even to zero: this is referred to as “writing off” a loan, but I will 
explain this concept in section 1.4.  
 
Today two European authorities publish statistical information about NPLs, based on bank’s 
supervisory reporting:  
• with respect to the entire Banking Union, the EBA publishes the Risk Dashboard, 
based on a sample of European banks, covering more than 80% of the banking sector 
by total assets; 
• with respect to the significant banks in the euro area, the ECB publishes the 
Supervisory Banking Statistics9.   
 
 
                                                 
9 The Supervisory Banking Statistics includes information on all banks in the euro area that are designated as 
significant institutions and so directly supervised by the ECB (as July 2019: 114 entities). 
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Since the financial crisis of 2007, the credit quality of loan portfolio has declined sharply in 
most European countries and the stock of Non-Performing Loans was around 1.0 trillion 
euros at the end of 2016 (i.e., 5.1% of total loans)10. The relevance of the NPLs issue in 
Europe is made clear by the statement in 2017 from Danièle Nouy11: “The quality of the 
assets of the banks continues to be a serious challenge in the banking union as a whole, but 
the problem is also concentrated in certain countries. Large volumes of non-performing loans 
are contributing to low bank profitability and making banks less able to provide new 
financing to the real economy” (Cerulli et al., 2017). Conversely, NPLs are not a critical 
problem in other countries, as it was observed by EBA in the 2016 report: “a cross-country 
comparison suggests that the average NPL ratio is up to three times higher in the EU than in 
other global jurisdictions”.  
 
In the European Union, the average NPLs is slowly decreasing, from 6.4% in December 2014 
to 5.4% at the end of 2016, and to 3.6% in June 2018. It is the result of two effects: a decrease 
of the stock of non-performing loans and the increase in the volume of total loans. This is also 
evident from the following figure (Figure 1.2) showing the trends of both the non-performing 
loan volume (the blue line) and the total loans quantity (the orange line) from December 2014 
to March 2019.  
 
Figure 1.2: Non-performing loans and total loans trend from 2014 to March 2019. 
 
Source: EBA Risk Dashboard (data as of 1Q 2019). 
                                                 
10 Source: data of ERSB 2017 
11 Danièle Nouy was the Chair of the Supervisory Board at the European Central Bank from January 2014 to 
December 2018. Today, Andrea Enria is the chairperson of the Supervisory Board.  
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As the following figure shows (Figure 1.3), the level of NPLs in the EU is still higher than in 
other major developed economies: the World Bank reported NPL ratios (even if the definition 
is different from the EBA’s one) close to 1% for the USA and Japan at the end of 2017, as 
shown in the following figure. 
 
Figure 1.3: Non-performing loans in EU, Japan and USA from 2010 to 2017 (in %). 
 
Source: World Bank data on NPLs. 
 
Overall, figure 1.4 makes a comparison between the stock of NPLs in the European Union 
and the NPLs of the rest of the world from 2010 to 2017: the EU displays an increase until 
2012 and a slow decrease reaching the same level of the rest of the world in 2017. As a matter 
of fact, as of 2017, the ratio for the EU stood just below the world average of 3.74%, at 3.7%, 
suggesting that non-performing loans are no longer a specific European trouble. It is evident 
that the highest level of bad loans is around the 2012, while in the rest of the world the level 
does not suffer at all.  
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Figure 1.4: NPL to gross loans, EU and world average comparison (2010-2017).  
 
Source: EBF with IMF and World Bank data. 
 
Since the financial crisis, the distribution of NPL has been different and unequal among the 
Member States. Moreover by the end of June 2018, three countries, receiving assistance from 
the EU in the past, still suffered a higher level of NPL (Greece, Cyprus and Portugal).  
In the last report of the EBA the ratio of non-performing loans has further declined to 3.1% 
from 3.2% in the Q4 of 2018, but at a slower pace than in the previous quarters12. This 
decrease of NPL ratio was mainly driven by an increase in the total volume of loans (3.4% 
growth quarter-over-quarter).  
 
Recently, in August 2019, the ECB published data about the evolution of NPLs: by the end of 
March 2019, numbers show that the volume of non-performing loans in the European banks is 
almost the half of the volume in March 2014, being now around 587 billion euro, with the 
NPL ratio at 3.7%. Despite recent progress, the ECB considers it of the highest importance 
that the level of NPLs is further reduced, while economic conditions are still favorable. 
Furthermore, the ECB has recently decided to soften the rules for non-performing loans 
written in the Addendum revising supervisory expectations for prudential provisioning for 
new NPLs to account for new Pillar 113 requirements for NPEs14.  
                                                 
12 EBA Risk Dashboard of Q1 2019.  
13 Basel II Accord, approved in 2004 and setting up risk and capital requirements, rests on three pillars: Pillar 1 
about the minimum capital requirement and addressing the maintenance of capital required for three major risks 
(credit risk, market risk and operational risk), Pillar 2 about supervisory review and finally Pillar 3 about market 
discipline, promoting greater stability in the financial system. Pillar 1 refers to minimum capital that all banks 
are legally required to hold under the Capital Requirements Regulation, so the new EU regulation, which 
outlines the Pillar 1 treatment for NPEs, is Regulation (EU) 2019/630 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 17 April 2019 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards minimum loss coverage for non-
performing exposures (entered into force on 26 April 2019).  
14 In the documentation, NPL and NPE terms are used interchangeably.  
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The new regulation, entering into force in 26 April 2019, complements the already established 
rules and requires a deduction from own funds when NPEs are not sufficiently covered by 
provisions.  
 
Figure 1.5 shows a comparison between the average annual growth of GDP from 2011 to 
2018 and the NPL ratio in 2018: Euro area (EA) bank profitability dampened by low growth 
and high NPL ratio. The lower profitability of the euro area banks compared with their global 
peers15 partly is caused by the weak growth environment and high non-performing loans. 
GDP growth in the euro area has been slowing behind that in other major economies in recent 
years.  However, the euro area significant institutions aggregate NPL ratio has fallen by 
around 2%, to around 4% in late 2018 (ECB, 2019).  
 
Figure 1.5: Annual growth of real GDP and NPL ratio: peers vs Euro Area (EA). 
 
Sources: Financial Stability Review (May 2019)16. 
 
 
Moreover, according to the last report of the European Commission of June 201917, risk 
reduction in the EU banking sector has maintained the strong momentum, built up over the 
past years. The NPLs in the Union are continuing their declining trend: the robustness of this 
downward move should encourage the EU and the member states to keep up their collective 
effort in order to convincingly address remaining NPL stocks and prevent future 
                                                 
15 Peers are weighted average of large banks in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.  
16 In particular, source: Standard & Poor’s, Bloomberg, IMF Financial Stability Indicators, IMF World 
Economic Outlook, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, national central banks, Eurostat, ECB and ECB 
calculations 
17 The Fourth Progress Report on the reduction of NPLs and further risk reduction in the Banking Union. 
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accumulations thereof. Particularly, in some European countries, NPL ratios remain a 
challenge and deserve continued attention.  
The average Tier 1 capital ratio18 of the euro area banks directly supervised by the SSM has 
remained stable, amounting to 15.54% in Q4-2018, compared to 15.63% in Q4-201719.  
 
Figure 1.6: Country dispersion of NPL ratios in EU (as of March 2019). 
 
Source: EBA Risk Dashboard (data as of 1Q 2019). 
Looking at the country dispersion of non-performing loans within the European Union 
(Figure 1.6), it is not surprising that Greece shows the highest ratio, followed by Cyprus, 
Portugal and Italy, higher even than the average EU level (orange line) around 3%. On the 
opposite, Sweden, Luxemburg and Germany show the lowest level of NPLs of the EU, as of 
the first quarter of 2019.  
 
The NPLs increase the risk in the balance sheet when the potential future losses are 
adequately covered or not. This measure is called coverage ratio.  Potential losses that are not 
covered by provisioning should be balanced out by expected future recoveries, by the 
expected realization of collateral. In addition, the average coverage ratio in the EU was at 
46% in the second quarter of 201820, but it should be evident that coverage ratios differ from 
among European economies.  
                                                 
18 The Tier 1 capital ratio is the ratio of a bank’s core tier 1 capital (its equity capital and disclosed reserves) to 
its total risk-weighted assets and it will better be analyzed in chapter 3.  
19 Data source: ECB’s supervisory banking statistics.  
20 Source: European Parliament (October 2018) “Non-performing loans in the banking union, stocktaking and 
challenges”. 
17 
 
As shown by the following figure (Figure 1.7), the coverage ratio of non-performing loans hit 
the highest value in the Hungarian banks, whereas the lowest level is in Estonia. The orange 
line represents the average level of the European Union (and European Economic Area).   
 
Figure 1.7: Country dispersion of coverage ratio (as of March 2019). 
 
Source: EBA Risk Dashboard (data as of 1Q 2019). 
 
Figure 1.8, instead, represents the non-performing loan ratio as a weighted average by country 
in the European Union, from June 2016 to June 2018. It does exhibit that nearly all countries 
have decreased their NPL ratios since 2017, with the exception of only three countries with 
low NPLs experiencing a marginal increase (Estonia, Latvia and Sweden). The largest 
decrease in NPLs ratio has been in Cyprus (-8.6 points) followed by Portugal, Ireland and 
Slovenia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
Figure 1.8: NPL ratio as a weighted average by country in the EU (June 2016 - June 2018). 
 
Source: EBA supervisory reporting data. 
 
Therefore, reducing the excessive level of bank NPLs has become a priority on the agenda of 
policymakers in Europe, because a high level of NPLs is a signal of an excessive leveraged 
non-financial sector, thus also economic growth could be negatively affected.  
 
The deep and prolonged recession that hit the Italian economy and lengthy credit recovery 
procedures have contributed to the high volume of NPLs in Italy’s banking system. Banca 
d’Italia believes that the problem of NPLs in Italy’s banks is serious but manageable, that it 
must be properly defined and dealt with, and that it is wrong to call it an emergency for the 
whole banking system (Banca d’Italia, 2017). 
 
High NPLs (as well as high provisions) are not only a drag on bank profitability, they also 
increase bank opacity (Kashian and Opiela 2012). The combination of the two effects reduce 
investors’ willing to lend to banks, leading to higher funding costs and a further negative 
impact on their ability to generate profits. Clearly, NPLs are risky assets attracting higher risk 
weights than performing loans. Thus, a large volume of NPLs ties up banks’ resources so 
supervisory institutions have released several reports to shed light on determinants and real 
effects of NPLs in Europe and to set out the possible solutions (Beck et al. 2013; IMF 2015; 
Klein 2013).  
 
Authorities need two key pieces of information: the size of NPL problem and the availability 
of bank capital (and provisions) to absorb losses. Measuring an NPL problem is not 
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straightforward, as data may be lacking, reporting may have been imprecise, and banks may 
have an incentive to extend forbearance.  
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CHAPTER 2 – NON-PERFORMING LOAN 
MANAGEMENT  
2.1 Assessing asset quality  
Between 2007 and 2012, EU countries had to deal with liquidity and solvency problems of 
banks through a number of state aid measures, including:  
1) Tier 1 capital injections, guarantees on bank funding instruments;  
2) direct liquidity to financial institutions; 
3) “asset relief” measures for different types of bad assets.  
These measures tried to “relieve” banks from assets that were considered “bad”, “impaired” 
or “toxic”, with a market value lower than the intrinsic value.  
Authorities have used different tools to assess the size of the NPL problem, as I described up 
to now. Again, traditional on-site inspections have been complemented with specialized AQR, 
less reliant on the bank own reporting, and this is generally preferred at time of crisis: this 
approach was used by the SSM when the last supervisor was set up in 2014. The SSM 
required clearly comparable approaches across member states.  
 
Legal and judicial constraints 
The NPL resolution options may also depend on the legal and judicial framework. In general, 
loans and their collateral are inclined to lose value during long resolving periods and related 
judicial proceedings. It is evident that effective insolvency regimes and debt enforcement are 
essential for debt resolution. The insolvency regime should provide mechanisms for creditors 
to realize their claims in a predictable, speedy and transparent way. Additionally, an effective 
insolvency regime is composed by an adequate resolution toolkit ranging rehabilitation to 
effective liquidation and an effective institutional setting, as reported by the IMF staff 
discussion note of September 201521.  
 
Many countries have reformed their legal framework, after the financial crisis, in order to 
improve NPL resolution. In Spain a 2013 law allows company to reach a pre-insolvency 
agreement with creditors and a new system of class voting has been introduced to approve a 
restructuring plan. Moreover, in Italy a set of reforms were introduced in 2015, including a 
new debt-restructuring tool, and the possibility of reaching an agreement between the firm 
                                                 
21 The IMF staff discussion note “A strategy for resolving Europe’s problem loans”, September 2015. 
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and its financial creditors (when the firm has more than 50% of outstanding debt with 
financial institutions). Again, the Ireland’s Personal Insolvency Act of 2012 introduces new 
procedures: a debt settlement arrangement providing for the disposition of unsecured debt 
over five years and an insolvency arrangement for cash-flow insolvent debtors to settle debt if 
approved by 65% of all creditors. The last example in Europe is Greece, where a law 
introduced in 2014 let temporary out-of-court workouts, whereas in 2016 a revision of the 
bankruptcy procedure leads to a reduction of the time needed for its completion by removing 
ancillary proceedings (FSI Insights, 2017).  
 
Texas ratio  
The Texas ratio provides a link between non-performing loans exposures and capital levels 
and it is therefore another useful key performance indicator. It is generally calculated by 
dividing the gross value of non-performing assets22 of a bank by the sum of its tangible 
common equity (the equity capital less goodwill and intangibles) capital and loan loss 
reserves (ECB 2017). A ratio higher than 100 (1:1) means that non-performing assets are 
greater than the resources which the bank might need to cover potential losses on those assets. 
It was developed in order to determine potential problem banks in the ’8023 and become 
almost “a cause cèlebre” among many trying to assess the financial health of financial 
institutions” (Jesswein K., 2009). This ratio gained quite a bit of notoriety in both the public 
media and in several areas of the web, in part due to its simplicity and the apparent success 
rate.   
It is important because it takes into consideration relevant factors in a bank health: the number 
of bad loans and the common equity (used to cover those bad loans). If there is not enough 
equity in the bank, this will not be able to absorb the many bad loans, leading to a possible 
failure. In conclusion, it is a relatively straightforward and effective way to determine the 
overall credit troubles experienced by financial institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 That is non-performing loans and the real estate owned by the bank because it foreclosed on the property. 
23 In Texas, by Gerard Cassidy working for the RBC Capital Markets as a method of assessing the credit issues 
in the banking institutions.  
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2.2 Policy instruments to resolve NPLs 
Different tools might be used to resolve NPLs, such as write-offs, direct sales of these loans, 
securitization, asset protection scheme and the asset management companies.  
 
Write-off 
Write-off is one of the simplest ways to dispose of NPLs, but banks usually have incentive to 
postpone them. It is a routine practice, but banks normally think twice about writing off NPLs 
from balance sheet, because of the implications for profits and capital. Banks prefer to keep 
the full value of these loans on their balance sheet. Low provisioning and capital levels 
represent a major obstacle to writing-off NPLs, because this approach is contingent on bank 
capital buffers and provisions, being sufficiently high to be able to absorb the losses. In 
practice, writing-off the loans does generate losses immediately, reducing bank capital when 
provisioning is too low (this cost is partly balanced by the fact that when NPLs are written 
off, the average risk-weights falls).  
In the Guidance of the ECB, the authority suggested that banking supervisors have to assist 
banks in formulating sound write-off criteria24. Once an amount has been written off from the 
balance sheet, it is not possible to write back that adjustment. Instead, for the sake of clarity, 
write-offs can be held before legal actions to recover the debt are completed against the 
borrower: the decision to legally lose the legal claim on the debt is called “debt forgiveness”.   
It must be noticed that write-off criteria under IFRS 9 and US GAAP are not the same and can 
lead to divergent practices: IFRS 9 requires write-offs if the entity has no reasonable 
prospects of recovering a financial asset in its entirety or a portion of it.   
 
Direct sales 
Another way to deal with NPL accumulation is the direct sales to a counterparty, which is 
usually another financial institution or investment funds. The selling bank provides 
prospective buyers with the information they need to conduct diligence. In some cases this 
instrument has covered packages of loans, rather than individual loans, taking advantage of 
the diversification of risks through the asset pooling. But the viability of this instrument 
depends on structural characteristics: the type of NPL influences the possibility to use it or not 
and transaction costs might be a second obstacle.  Information asymmetry can lead to large 
bid-ask spread and so prevent direct sales: buyers and sellers need to agree on a fair price for 
                                                 
24 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 2006 paper, “Sound credit risk assessment and valuation 
for loans”, page 13.  
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making the sale happen. Bid-ask spread might be caused by banks not fully incorporating the 
costs of working out impaired assets into their provisioning levels (Fell et al., 2016). In 
addition, this gap between the prices may be the reason for a small part of the potential 
tradeable assets.  
Public information about NPL sales volumes is scarse, but some data can be found in the 
reports of private sector companies. In the EU loan portfolio sales were estimated at about 
104 euro billion in 2015 (Deloitte, 2017). The market grew from 30 euro billion in 2013, and 
in 2015, around 66% of loan portfolio transactions are loans collateralized by residential and 
commercial real estate. The major buyers in the EU market are US hedge funds and private 
equity funds. Regardless of the rapid growth in Europe’s NPL market, the majority of 
countries still consider the local distressed market to be either too small or not sufficiently 
effective (EBA, 2016). Countries have, indeed, different approaches to manage direct sales. 
Authorities may support the creation of mixed public-private investment funds purchasing the 
NPLs in direct sales. They may rely on both the volatility of buying capacity by the state and 
its willingness to activate a market for the sale of these bad assets. Another approach regards 
countries opting to rely on more developed NPL markets abroad: specialized buyers helping 
to overcome some difficulties of the asymmetric information.  
Moreover, direct sales can identify a benchmark and a floor price for NPLs: when direct sales 
take place, a floor for the NPL valuation is set, giving a benchmark for potential buyers and 
banks. 
NPL sales are sometimes considered as a silver bullet that might help banks to shore up 
balance sheets, decreasing the recovery risk and increasing the lending capacity to originate 
new NPLs25.  
 
Securitization   
Securitization is a more complex way of managing NPLs, but it increases the number of 
possible buyers. In a securitization, the cash flows from NPLs are pooled to create security 
with senior, mezzanine and subordinate tranches (see Figure 1.9): each tranche has a different 
risk-reward profile. The advantage of this tool is the risk diversification away from a single 
credit name, so investors are able to choose the risk-reward combination that best reflects 
their preferences. Indeed, securitization converts NPLs to marketable securities, which could 
be chosen by a large pool of buyers, and if guarantees are provided to these securitized assets, 
the price of NPLs can be higher than the direct sale.  
                                                 
25 Source: European Parliament (2017). 
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An example of guarantees is the Italian GACS and Atlante Fund. Non-performing loans 
securitization has become one of the major topics in Italy when Bank of Italy agreed with the 
European Commission a Guaranteed Scheme which facilitates the disposal of NPL through a 
securitization process. This scheme has opened again the door to NPL securitization market 
which still involves only few investors. 
Particularly the Italian supervisors introduced a guarantee scheme to support securitization of 
NPLs in 2016: “Garanzia Cartolarizzazione Sofferenze” (GACS) covers only the senior 
tranches of securitization notes and it is priced at market conditions (using as a starting point 
the single name CDS of Italian Issuers. These conditions helped to avoid breaching state aid 
rules. Italy led the NPL securitization market in 2017, with euro 22 billion of sales related to 
securitization. Italian banks sell the NPLs to SPVs established by third-party service provider, 
which pools NPLs into senior, mezzanine and junior tranches. Moreover, private sector 
entities set up two funds (Atlante 1 and Atlante 2 created in 2016) which buy the mezzanine 
and junior tranches.  
The main actors about the NPL management have been BPM, with the 7.8 euro billion 
transfer announced in December 2018, Intesa San Paolo in 10.8 euro billion agreement with 
Intrum, Unicredit, Iccrea Banca, UBI, Creval, MPS, BPER and Gruppo Delta26.  
For example, more than half of Unicredit euro 17.7 billion project FINO NPL portfolio, the 
largest GACS, was secured27, as of February 2018.    
By the end of 2019, the group Iccrea is going to sell NPLs amounting to 1.2 euro billion 
through the GACS. This decision represents “an important signal showing the positive action 
by the creation of the Gruppo Bancario Cooperativo Iccrea”. Moreover, according to CFO 
Giovanni Boccuzzi, the foreseen securitizations “follows the 2018 ones for a gross book value 
of over 3 euro billion and it is going to involve over 60 banks of the Gruppo Bancario 
Cooperativo Iccrea. It takes part of the NPL management strategy with a value of 1.8 euro 
billion”28.  
 
The new EU Securitization Regulation (the SR)29 has become applicable across the EU on 1st 
January 2019, introducing new obligations for originators, sponsors, issuers and investors in 
securitization transactions, monitoring the correct application of those criteria. This regulation 
                                                 
26 Source: https://www.abbrevia.it/it/News--Focus/Cessioni-NPL-gli-ultimi-accordi-sui-crediti-deteriorati-
del155712730716874 
27 Source: Unicredit website press release of 7 February 2018.  
28 Source: http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/economia/2019/07/23/iccrea-bacaverso-cessione-npl-12-
mld_88396856-9530-4dc4-bae7-a03a27898b86.html  
29 Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 and 2017/2402 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2017.  
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aims at establishing a more risk sensitive set of rules to discourage credit institutions from 
adopting complex products. To this end, the new provision defines a set of criteria to identify 
less risky products, as the Simple Transparent and Standardized (STS) securitization and 
some common requirements on risk detention, due diligence and disclosure for financial 
services sectors.  
 
The main difference between the NPL securitization and the standard one, does depend on the 
non-predictability nature of the cash flows of the assets which are unstable and more difficult 
to forecast.  
The first securitization on NPL was in 1989 in the USA, by the Resolution Trust Corporation 
that bought assets and recovered almost 90% through structured operation.  
In Asia, because NPL represented the major issue for banks, the Korea Asset Management 
was the first NPL securitization deal in Korea30. In Europe, NPL securitization has been used 
in Italy before the credit crunch of 2007 and slightly in Germany (the first transaction was in 
2006).  
There are differences between the standard structure of securitization on performing assets 
and the securitization of non-performing loans: the two main ones are true sale and 
bankruptcy remoteness. 
 
Figure 1.9 shows that the more risky bonds (junior notes) are designed to absorb the first 
losses whenever recoveries on the assigned receivables fall behind expectations and offer 
higher returns. In order of attribution of losses, there are the mezzanine notes and lastly the 
senior notes offering medium-high returns. The liability tranches vary in size according to the 
expected returns and the risks of the assets side of the vehicle. Potential buyers of senior notes 
are monetary funds, insurance companies and the other banks, as already explained. 
Conversely, the junior notes are managed by specialized investors. The benefits of 
securitizations lie in a smaller average cost of capital (weighted average cost of capital, 
WACC31), that can be obtained through liability tranching, usually with a higher transfer 
price.   
 
                                                 
30 Korea was country heavily hit by the currency crisis in 1997: at that time, NPL were at 20/30% level, so the 
government was required to mandate Korea Asset Management Company to acquire NPL from the banks backed 
by bond issuances.  
31 The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is a calculation of a firm’s cost of capital in which each 
category of capital is proportionately weighted. All sources of capital, including common stock, preferred stock, 
bonds and any other long-term debt, are included in this formula. In other words, it is the average rate of return 
that a company expects to compensate all investors. The weights are the fraction of each financing source in the 
company target capital structure.  
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Figure 1.9: Securitization vehicle scheme. 
 
Source: Prometeia “NPL management insight”.   
 
Asset protection scheme  
Asset protection scheme (APS) is typically crisis-related instrument to support individual 
banks with exceptionally high level of NPLs, being an insurance scheme to help banks. APS 
is created to support credit provision by banks, as NPLs can crowd out new credit, so it is 
usually put in place during a banking crisis, when the risk of a credit crunch is less 
manageable. In particular, banks need to agree with the Treasury the amount of assets and 
what type of assets they can insure, because the original idea was that the Treasury would 
cover 90% of bank losses, charging a fee for the insurance provided.  
An example is UK, where the Treasure launched in 2009 an APS scheme, selecting two 
banks, but only one agreed to participate to the scheme. Royal Bank of Scotland announced to 
place GBP 282 billion of assets in the scheme, so the bank undertook to absorb the first losses 
on the portfolio up to 6% of the value and stipulated a formal commitment to increase the 
loans to customers (up to 25 GBP billion).  
In general, this measure aimed at individual banks, unsuitable for managing systemic risk 
situations. In terms of public finances, it does not require immediate and direct disbursement, 
but only the undertaking of a guarantee commitment that may result in greater potential 
expenditures in future, only in the event of negative evolution of the economic and financial 
situation of the bank involved.  
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Asset management companies (AMC) 
Another tool that can be used to offload NPLs from the bank balance sheet is the so called 
“bad bank”, also known as “asset management company” (“AMC”) or “asset management 
vehicle” (“AMV”). This refers to a specialized entity (not necessarily a financial institution) 
buying non-performing exposures at a higher price than private-sector investors, but in line 
with (or below) the bad loans’ “real economic value” (REV). While in principle a bad bank 
may rely entirely on private money, some degree of public support is often required to ease 
funding constraints and enhance the vehicle’s loss-bearing capacity. As part of its NPL 
package, the Commission provided Member States with an AMC Blueprint. This document 
gives non-binding and practical guidance on how they can set up, if they wish so, national 
AMCs, in fully compliance with EU legislation. The Blueprint elaborated upon some core 
principles, such as the relevant asset perimeter, the participation perimeter, considerations on 
the asset-size threshold, asset valuation rules, the appropriate capital structure and the 
governance and operations of the AMC.  
 
An AMC may prove beneficial in several ways:  
1) it prevents banks from disorderly liquidating NPLs (by selling them and/or their 
collateral at a price lower than the fair value) and provides a means to gradually 
recover loans and dispose assets once market conditions have reverted to normal; 
2) when assisted by some kind of public guarantee, an AMC makes it possible to issue 
debt at an acceptable cost, which in turn improves the final net value of recoveries; an 
AMC could be replaced by a “nation-wide securitization special purpose vehicle” 
raising funds from private investors at acceptable costs, thanks to a public guarantee 
on senior tranches (Brno et al. 2017);  
3) it may benefit from scale economies and specific professional skills that increase the 
efficiency of the workout process, while improving coordination among multiple 
banks involved in complex recovery procedure;  
4) it may force banks to update and revise their estimates of the transferred asset REV, 
since an independent valuation is usually required before NPLs can be moved to the 
bad bank.  
The use of AMCs as a tool to manage bank crisis must take into account the provisions 
dictated by the BRRD and by various communications issued by the European Commission’s 
Directorate General Competition.  
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Under Article 42 of the BRRD, the Resolution Authority may set up an AMV which some 
assets and liabilities of the resolved bank can be transferred to, if this is needed to ensure the 
proper functioning of the latter, in order to avoid adverse market effects of to maximize 
liquidation proceeds. However, AMVs can only be used in conjunction with other “resolution 
tool” including sale of business, bridge institutions and bail in. Furthermore, a bail in should 
always be applied before a bank can benefit from the financial intervention of the Resolution 
Fund or from public funds. The AMCs can be privately or publicly owned, centralized or 
bank-specific, and the scope of banking assets to be treated under the AMCs varies. Typically, 
single-bank AMCs are set up when the NPL issues are limited to a few individual banks (for 
example the first phase of the Swedish banking crisis), while sector-wide or centralized 
AMCs are more suitable for systemic problems (for example the Asian countries in the 
1990s).  
 
According to Klingebiel (2000), the concept of “bad banks” has a long global history, with 
troubled banks segregating their assets into two or more categories, allocating risky and 
illiquid financial assets including non-performing loans to a “bad bank” entity. Many financial 
and organizational and structural factors need to be taken into consideration when declaring 
whether assets are “bad”. The organizational models might vary: the options are “internal 
Restructuring Unit” or “External Bad Bank” (Pinedo, 2009; Aggarwal et al., 2012).   
 
Furthermore, AMCs have been used in many crisis-based countries. For example, Securum 
was established in 1993 in Sweden, as a government-owned company, to work out the NPLs 
of the state-owned bank Nordbanken. At the start, 20% of Nordenbank’s loan portfolio was 
transferred to Securum. By 1996, the AMC had disposed of 98% of its assets: properties were 
sold on an individual basis, grouped together in packages, or as whole property companies. 
Although the lifetime of Securum was initially expected to be 10 to 15 years, it was closed 
down in 1997.  
In Ireland, NAMA (National Asset Management Agency) was set up in 2009 by the 
government and it created special purpose vehicles controlled by NAMA but with a majority 
of the shares held by private investors. So NAMA ownership is a private/public hybrid with 
the aim of acquiring impaired assets from financial institutions. Together with Erste 
Abwicklungsanstalt in Germany, both established in 2009, these two AMCs are example of 
state/owned bad banks in the EU.  
The last but not the least example is Spain, where SAREB was established in 2012 as a 
private-for-profit company with a public mandate. Most of the shares are privately owned 
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(55%)32, while 45% are owned by the public Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring, which was 
established in 2009 to manage the restructuring and resolution of credit institutions. SAREB 
acquired EUR 106 billion of NPLs from the banks.  
In conclusion, the main question remains whether to hold assets until maturity or to sell them 
(at a fast or slow way). The bad bank’s overall cost of capital and its funding environment 
will determine the need to rapidly release risk-weighted assets at the potential expense o de-
leveraging losses. 
 
 
Summing up the tools, the bank-specific policy instruments available for solving the 
accumulation of NPLs are listed in the following table (Figure 1.10). 
 
 
Figure 1.10: Policy instruments to resolve systemic NPLs. 
 
Source: FSI Insights on policy implementation n.3 (2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 The classification, as private entities, implies that transactions, financial assets and liabilities of these 
institutions are not included in the general government accounts. The classification outside the public sector was 
determined by the independence of these entities to adopt decisions, since capital is private-held in the main, by 
their objectives, by the limited duration considered and by the restricted size of potential losses relative to 
liabilities.  
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2.3 What’s the value of non-performing loans? An overview 
Harmonized cost approach  
According to the harmonized cost method, it takes care of the discounted future expected cash 
flows over the lifetime of a loan. The discounting considers the time value of money. 
Furthermore, according to IAS, the original effective interest rate, i, of the loan is used to 
discount factor33. The gross book value (GBV) is calculated as:  
 
 
 
Where f is the expected cash flows. But when the debtor is not able to repay the loan, the bank 
has to assess several factors, like the probability of repaying the whole debt by the due time, 
the recoverable amount and the cash flow recovery time, which is different from the one 
written in the contract of the loan.  
 
So a new and different estimation of the cash flows is computed. In order to estimate the 
expected cash flow, f’, bank has to consider the direct costs of managing NPLs, even if it does 
not consider indirect costs, so the NPL net book value (NBV) is:  
 
 
Where f’ is the new cash flows in which are included the direct sots of managing NPLs, but 
not the indirect costs so it is revised downwards in view of the new financial situation of the 
borrower. 
 
For this reason, the value adjustment is the difference between these two values:  
 
 
 
 
Usually, the book value of a bad loan is much higher than the price that the investors are 
willing to pay. There are several factors influencing the price of the loan but most important 
                                                 
33 Source: IAS 39, “Financial instruments: recognition and measurement”.  
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are: the indirect management cost effect34, the rate of return effect35 and the overall effect. the 
last one takes into account the other two36.    
 
From IAS 39 to IFRS 9  
Several researches have studied the information contained in the loans and the relative credit 
risk disclosures (as Wahlen, 1994; Barth et al., 1996, Nissim, 2003; Kahan and Ozel, 2016) 
and as a consequence of the financial crisis, interest in the analysis of the credit risk in banks 
has increased (Blankespoor et al., 2013; Cantrell et al.,  2014).   
There are different criteria to calculate the value of NPLs in the balance sheet of the banks. 
The EU is encouraging the development of secondary markets for non-performing loans, 
which would allow banks more easily to manage or sell bad loans.  
Currently, potential buyers of bad loans face barriers to cross-border purchases of credit due 
to different regulatory regimes in the member state. This has led to an inefficient secondary 
market for NPLs, with low demand, weak competition and low bid prices (European Council, 
2019).   
The recovery time is supposed to affect the valuation of a bad loan, both in terms of 
accounting value and market value.  
 
Moreover, predicting how many of the loans will default is a key for valuation and it is not an 
easy exercise but certainly an important one as this is a major part of the valuation.  
Loans are typically the largest class on the balance sheet of the banks: understanding the value 
of loans is vital to any assessment of the flexibility of the banking system.   
Valuing loans would be easy in perfect markets37, so loans would be equal to the sum of 
expected discounted cash flows. But markets are not perfect, particularly for loans. As a 
result, there are several approaches for valuing loans. Moreover, nature of loans of banks has 
changed markedly over time.  
                                                 
34 It refers to the fact that indirect costs of managing these bad loans might account for as much as 6& of 
nominal expected cash flow.   
35 This means discounting future cash flows with the expected effective rate of return.  
36 Ciavoliello L., Ciocchetta F., Conti F., Guida I., Rendina A., Santini G. (2016), “What’s the value of NPLs”, 
Banca d’Italia.  
37 Like perfect competition, no taxes, no transaction costs, information is fully available to everyone at no cost, 
all financial assets are infinitely divisible, and individuals are rational.   
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So the international accounting standards board (IASB) in 2014 published the IFRS 9 
Financial Instruments, which includes a new standard for loan loss provisioning based on 
“expected credit losses” (ECL)38. 
 
Furthermore, for banks reporting under the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS), 1 January 2018 marked the transition to the new IFRS 939, that is a new era per 
impairment allowances for the European Union:  
1) it simplifies asset accounting in financial statements and measurements; 
2) it introduces a forward-looking impairment model; 
3) it incorporates new accounting requirements for recording profits and losses on 
derivatives and the associated hedge instruments.  
The new standards require impairment allowances for all exposures form the time a loan is 
originated, based on the deterioration of credit risk since the initial recognition.  
While the definition of “impaired” loan has remained unchanged, IFRS 9 requires amore 
granular assessment of credit risk in comparison to IAS 39.  
 
Under IFRS 9, applicable entities must place financial instruments into three distinct stages: 
1) “performing” (stage 1), covering instruments that have not deteriorated significantly in 
credit quality since initial recognition or that have low credit risk (provisions are 
calculated on 12-months ECL);  
2) “underperforming” (stage 2), covering instruments that have deteriorated significantly 
in credit quality since initial recognition, but which do not show objective evidence of 
credit loss event (based on lifetime ECL); 
3) “non-performing” (stage 3), rather that the “unimpaired” and “impaired” categories of 
IAS 3940, it covers instruments including events that had a damaging impact on the 
estimated future cash flows at the reporting date (that is financial difficulty of 
borrowers), and it is based on lifetime ECL as the previous stage.  
 
The three-stage classification process is used not only to highlight the credit quality of the 
exposure but also to determine the method used to calculate expected credit losses. Moreover, 
IFRS 9 assumes that a loan has a significant credit risk when it becomes 30 day past due and 
so it must be shown in stage 2 or 3, where provisions are based on lifetime ECL.  
                                                 
38 IASB (2014): IFRS 9 also includes new rules for classification and measurement of financial instruments and 
hedge accounting.  
39 This standard is effective for fiscal years beginning after 15 December 2019.  
40 Stage 3 is close to the IAS 39 definition of impaired.  
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Under IFRS 9, lifetime ECL is the expected present value of losses that arise if borrower does 
default on their obligations at some moment during the life of the financial asset. In other 
words, the expected credit loss is the weighted average of credit losses with the probability of 
default as the weight41.  
The relationship between lifetime and 12-month ECL will depend on many factors, including 
the maturity of the loan, how default risks and recovery values are expected to evolve over the 
loan life (Cohen B. et al., 2017).  
 
Finally, the new ECL provisioning standards aims at inducing a big change in low banks 
approach and manage credit risk. While the full impact of this new introduction will not be 
clear at the beginning, the banks participating in the EBA survey in 2017 expected their 
provisions to increase by an average 18% due to the treatment of non-defaulted loans with 
significant increase in credit risk. 
 
2.4 Literature review  
Non-performing loans have attracted more attention in recent decades. Several studies 
examined bank failure and find that asset quality is an indicator of insolvency (Demirguc-
Kunt, 1989; Barr and Siems, 1994). Moreover, the empirical literature on the relation between 
the macroeconomic conditions and the asset quality is wide.  
For this reason, the minimization of NPL is a necessary condition for improving economic 
growth: when NPL are kept for a long time, there will have an impact on the resources that 
are enclosed in unprofitable areas. Thus, NPLs are likely to hamper economic growth and 
reduce the economic efficiency (Hou, 2007). The shocks to the financial system can arise 
from factors specific to the company (idiosyncratic shocks) or macroeconomic imbalances 
(system shocks).  
The literature about the non-performing loans is full of studies trying to analyze and explain 
bad loans. Many authors concluded that non-performing loans are influenced by 
macroeconomic variables, like GDP growth of the country, inflation rate, real interest rate, 
unemployment rate, whereas there are different bank-specific variables that are considered 
indicators of future bad loans.  
                                                 
41 Lifetime ECL does consider the amount and timing of payments, so credit loss, that is the credit shortfall, 
arises even if banks expect to be repaid in full but later than due. Moreover, Lifetime ECL shall continue to be 
reported for loans in this stage of credit deterioration but interest revenue is calculated on the basis or the lower 
net amortized cost carrying amount, that is the gross carrying amount adjusted for the loss allowance.    
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One of the most relevant study regarding this topic is the paper of Louzis et al. (2010) about 
the determinants of non-performing loans in the Greek banking sector, separately for the 
different types of loan (consumer, business and mortgage loan). Indeed, using a method of 
dynamic panel data as econometric approach, they chose a data set of large Greek banks for 
the period 2003 to 2009, in order to examine the determinants of NPLs for each category of 
loan. The authors concluded that the stock of impaired loans is driven both by macroeconomic 
variables (GDP, unemployment and interest rates) and management quality, and in particular 
the NPL on mortgages are less sensitive to macroeconomic conditions. Their results are 
consistent with what found by Espinosa and Prasad (2010). As a matter of fact, within a 
sample of 80 banks in the Golf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries from 1995 to 2008, the 
authors discovered that the non-performing loan ratio raised when economic growth became 
lower, the interest rate and risk aversion increased. In other words, their model suggested that 
the cumulative effect of macroeconomic shocks over a period of three years is actually 
relevant.  
 
In the paper by Milani (2017), “What factors affect non-performing loans during 
macroeconomic and financial turbulence? Evidence from Italy” examined the macroeconomic 
and the bank-specific variables that affect non-performing loans (NPLs) in Italy over the 
period 2006-2015 considering a sample of 482 juridical different banks operating in Italy. 
Testing nine hypotheses in his dynamic panel model, he found out that there is a strong 
evidence that bank managers have a relevant role in the increase of NPLs after the financial 
crisis. Moreover, he concluded that in his case the macroeconomic variables do not have a 
significant impact on NPLs in Italy in that timespan: in particular, a high level of public debt 
does not impact NPLs when leverage is included.  
 
Furthermore, Bruno and Immacolata (2016) analyzed the role of banks loan quality in 
explaining lending patters in the European Union before and after the onset of the Euro 
sovereign debt crisis, through a difference-in-difference econometric approach. So, the sample 
has been divided into two timespans: prior the sovereign crisis (2005-2009) and after the 
crisis (2010-2014). The results highlighted the existence of a negative nexus between poor 
loan quality and lending: a higher NPL ratio explains a reduced loan growth and a lower 
allocation to loans at the advantage of government debt. They also stressed the need to 
manage non-performing loan problem, being poor loan quality a drag on bank lending. 
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Another paper by Messai and Jouini (2013) examined the determinants of NPLs within a 
sample of 85 banks in three countries: Italy, Greece and Spain. In the period from 2004 to 
2008, they chose the countries that had problems after the 2008 financial crisis and with the 
worst public finance in the European Union. They found out that GDP growth and return on 
assets of credit institutions have a negative impact on non-performing loans, while the 
unemployment rate and the real interest rate affect positively impaired loans of the banks. The 
bank-specific variables they took into account were the return on assets, the change in loans 
and the loan loss reserves to total loan ratio, and with the application of panel model 
approach, the results suggested that provision of banks increased with NPLs.  
 
In addition, the paper by Accornero, Alessandri, Caripinelli and Sorrentino (2017 studied the 
linkage between NPLs and the supply of bank credit. With a sample of more than 500 Italian 
banks and 2.5 million borrowers over the last 8 years, the authors used a time-varying firm 
fixed effect to control for shifts in demand and changes in borrowers characteristics between 
2008 and 2015. They also took into account the supervisory intervention of 2014 (the Asset 
Quality Review carried out by the ECB together with other European supervisory authorities) 
as an exogenous shock, even if in the end the results suggest that the correlation between 
NPLs and credit is driven by demand-side effects. Overall, the impact of AQR on bank 
lending was positive. In particular, the paper compared the lending behavior of AQR banks to 
that of non-AQR banks before and after the exercise, so from an econometric approach they 
used a diff-in-diff model, because there has been a systematic downward shift in credit supply 
for banks that were subjected to the review relative to those that were not. So, they considered 
2012-2013 as the pre-treatment period and 2014-2015 as the post-treatment period, because 
the AQR was announced in October 2013 and conducted throughout 2014 based on bank-
balance sheet results of end-2013. The results showed that lending was on average higher for 
AQR-banks and the differential pattern continued after the supervisory exercise. However, the 
negative interaction between NPL ratios and AQR dummy shows that AQR-banks which had 
a higher share of non-performing exposures lent on average relatively less, supporting the 
case of a differentiated behavior across AQR-banks based on their initial credit quality. 
Moreover, after the revisions induced by the AQR, the impact of NPL ratios within AQR-
banks seemed mitigated: this could be interpreted by the improvement in transparency and 
confidence yielded by the review, but also other macroeconomic factors may be considered. 
Overall, despite the causal effects, the AQR didn’t decrease the supply of bank credit, as it 
will be also confirmed in the second part of the analysis. The second part of the paper tried to 
identify the impact on credit supply of an exogenous variation in NPLs: the analysis focused 
36 
 
on the flow of provisions over operating profits and the flow of new NPLs over total 
outstanding loans, both a measure of changes in credit quality. With the use of these tow 
instrumental variables and including again firm fixed effects, that capture the overall change 
in credit for each borrower over the period of interest, the authors conclude that exogenous 
shocks to the banks NPL ratios might have a negative impact on credit supply. Evidences 
suggest that exogenous NPL shocks must have had a minor role in Italy over that period: NPL 
ratios did not fluctuate under the influence of exogenous shocks to the bank balance sheets 
and so they are not significant drivers of bank lending in their sample, also confirmed by the 
instrumental variables results. In conclusion, the paper suggests that bank’s lending behavior 
is not causally affected by the level of NPL ratio, because the negative correlation between 
NPL ratios and credit growth is created by changes in firm’s conditions and contractions in 
their demand for credit.  
 
Another study by Abid, Ouertani and Zouari-Ghorbel (2013) about “macroeconomic and 
bank-specific determinants of household’s non-performing loans in Tunisia” examined the 
determinants of households’ NPLs only over 2003-2012, exploring the main effect of macro 
and bank-specific variables on the quality of loans. This specific analysis on Tunisian banks 
shows that macroeconomic variables (real GDP growth, inflation rate and the real lending 
rate) influence the level of NPLs in the country. Also, using a dynamic panel data approach, 
the authors showed that measures of performance and efficiency of a bank may be used as an 
indicator for future bad loans, supporting the hypothesis of bad management in the increase of 
NPLs. They suggest that to prevent future financial instability the authorities should consider 
the systems of risk management and the bank procedures: the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) encourages the solving of management problems at bank level to reduce NPLs. 
 
The last similar paper is the one of Mohanty, Ranjan Das and Kumar (2018) about 
“determinants of non-performing loans in India: a system GMM panel approach” in which the 
authors investigated the determinants of NPLs of Indian banking sector from 2001 to 2016, 
with the use of the system GMM panel estimation approach. This method reduces finite 
sample bias and any other imprecision by regressing levels and changes in NPLs of its lags 
and other explanatory variables using lagged levels as instruments. The results showed that 
economic growth, stock market index and market capitalization ratio had a negative impact on 
the gross NPL ratio, while expansionary fiscal policy escalates the NPL ratio. The corporate-
specific variables, instead, as net sales growth and net profit margin had a statistically 
negative impact on NPL ratio, while bank-specific variables, as growth in bank branches, 
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higher return on equity, higher credit deposit ratio lowered the ratio. They also found that 
higher operating expense ratio had a positive effect on NPLs, concluding that strengthening 
the balance sheet of private corporate sectors will strengthen the balance sheet of banks by 
lowering NPLs.  
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CHAPTER 3 – ANALYSIS SPECIFICATION  
3.1 The econometric approach: panel data 
I use panel data techniques to analyze and quantify the impact of the introduction of the 
BRRD on the stock of non-performing loans of a sample of significant European banks from 
2011 to 2017. This allows me to capture the bank-specific effects and the unobservable 
differences between banks. Using a panel data approach, one can control for the biases 
generated by potential heterogeneity and omitted variables problems. Also, the decision of 
using panel data comes from the fact that panel data can take explicit account for individual-
specific heterogeneity, by combining data in two dimensions. Panel data gives a more data 
variation, less collinearity and more degrees of freedom, it is better suited than cross-sectional 
data for studying the dynamics of change, and finally, it is better in detecting and measuring 
the effects which cannot be observed in either cross-section or time-series data.  
Panel data collects information about several individuals (cross-sectional) over several 
periods and in this case the panel is balanced because all units are observed in all periods. In 
particular, a wide panel has the cross-sectional dimension (N) much larger that the 
longitudinal dimension (T) and the same units are observed in all periods. 
 
Panel data approach is a continuously developing field: the basic linear panel model used in 
econometrics may be described through suitable restrictions of the following general model:  
 
Where i=1,..,n is the individual (group, country) index, t=1,..,T is the time index and uit a 
random disturbance term of mean 0.  
 
Pooled OLS model  
First, I use a pooled regression approach. Since panel data combines both time series and 
cross-section data, it has the advantage to reduce collinearity among explanatory variables 
especially when the number of years is low and pooling enables to control for exogenous 
shocks common to all banks (time effects) and reducing the omitted variable bias (unit 
effects). However, simple pooled regression may not be well designed to capture relationships 
between the dependent variable and explanatory variables. This is due to the fact that pooled 
regression assumes homogenous behavior of endogenous variable for all individuals in the 
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sample (same intercept and same slopes). This is not obviously the case for the variable 
NPLs, as it varies considerably between countries and over years. Several alternative 
estimation methods are more suitable for panel data (fixed and random effects).  
A pooled model has the following specification, which does not allow for intercept or slope 
differences among individuals: 
 
Where i=1,..,N refers to individual (cross-sectional unit) and t=1,…,T denotes the time period 
(longitudinal unit), so the total number of observations in the panel is NxT.  
 
To notice that OLS consists of five core assumptions:  
1) linearity: it says that the dependent variable is formulated as a linear function of a set 
of independent variables and the error term; 
2) exogeneity; it says that the expected value of error terms is zero or error terms are not 
correlated with any regressors; 
3) Homoskedasticity says that the error terms have the same variance, while 
heteroskedasticity refers to different variances (its violation is called autocorrelation); 
4) The observations on the independent variable are not stochastic but fixed in repeated 
samples without measurement errors; 
5) Full rank assumption says that there is no exact linear relationship among the 
independent variables (no multicollinearity). 
 
Fixed effect model 
The fixed effect model takes into account individual differences, namely different intercepts 
of the regression line for different individuals. In other words, it is simply a linear regression 
model in which the intercept terms vary over the individual units i. The model in this case 
assigns the subscript i to the constant term β1, as shown in the following equation:  
 
The constant terms calculated in this way are called fixed effects. Variables changing little or 
not at all over time, like some individual characteristics should not be included in a fixed 
effects model because they produce collinearity with the fixed effects.  
 
There are several strategies for estimating a fixed effect model: the least squares dummy 
variable model (LSDV) uses dummy variables, whereas the “within” estimation does not. 
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These strategies produce the identical parameter estimates of regressors (non-dummy 
independent variables).  
The within estimation does not need dummy variables, but it uses deviations from group (or 
time period) means. That is, “within” estimation uses variation within each individual or 
entity (in this case, banks) instead of a large number of dummies. The within estimation is: 
 
Where  is the mean of dependent variable of individual (group) i,  reprensents the means 
of independent variables of group i, and  is the mean of errors of group i. This estimation 
reports correct sum of squared errors (SSE), even if it has some disadvanges as the other 
estimations. In addition, the within group estimator requires strict exogeneity of the X’s with 
respect to the error term, but allows for correlation between the X’s and the invidual effect. 
Differently from the random effect as follows, the within group uses only within-group 
variability and it is less efficient than the random effect when RE is consistent.  
 
Random effect model 
The random effects model goes in more detail than the fixed effects by recognizing that, since 
the individuals in the panel are randomly chosen, their characteristics, measured by the 
intercept β1t should also be random. Therefore, random effect model has   where is the 
popolation average and ui is an individual-specific random term: as in the previous case, this 
model is also time-invariant:  
 
So the final equation is:  
 
Here, the intercept is constant across individuals, but the error term νit, incorporates both 
individual specifics and the initial regression error term:  
 
 
Moreover, the random effects model has a specific error term: it has zero mean, a variance 
σ2u+σ2e, uncorrelated across individuals and with timewise covariance equal to σ2u . An 
important characteristic of this model is that timewise correlation in the errors does not 
decrease over time. It requires strict exogeneity of the X’s with respect to the error term and 
the very strong condition that they do not correlate even with the individual effect.  
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In addition, random effects estimator is reliable under the assumption that individual 
characteristics (heterogeneity) are exogenous, so they are independent with respect to the 
regressors in the random effects equation. RE estimator combines within-group and between 
groups variability, even if it is consisent RE is biased in infinite samples.  
The idea of the random effects model is that, differently from the fixed effects model, is that 
the variation across entities is assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the predictor or 
independent variables included in the model.  
 
Generalized least squares (GLS) 
Under the random effect assumptions, OLS is inefficient but consistent, so in this case the 
composite disturbance term means that OLS is not appropriate: GLS (generalized least 
squares) is the right one, which takes into account the covariance structure of the error term. 
With the random effects model, the degrees of freedom increases, and greater efficiency 
might be gained using the generalized least squares (GLS).  
 
In both ordinary least squares and maximum likelihood approaches to parameter estimation, 
there is the assumption of constant variance, that is the variance of an observation is the same 
regardless of the values of the explanatory variables associated with it, and since the 
explanatory variables determine the mean value of the observation, the variance of the 
observation unrelated to the mean is assumed42.  
 
Hausman test  
The (Durbin-Wu-)Hausman test for endogeneity may be used with the null hypothesis that 
indivudal random effects are exogenous. A low p-value of the test indicates that the null 
hypothesis is rejected: random effect becomes inconsistent. This means that the fixed effects 
model is the correct solution. The Hausam test uses that “the covariance of an efficient 
estimator with its difference from an inefficient estimator is zero” (Greene, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Sources are Menke W. (2014), “Review of the Generalized Least Squares method”, Springer and Verbeek M. 
(2004), “A guide to modern econometrics”, 2nd edition, John Wiley and Sons, Ltd. 
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Other diagnostic tests 
Fixed effects are tested by the F test, while random effects are examined by the Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) test (Breusch-Pagan, 1980). In the first test, the null hypothesis is that all 
dummy parameters except for one for the dropped are all zero: 
 
The alternative hypothesis is that at least one dummy parameter is not zero. The F test is 
based on loss of goodness-of-fit. 
The Breusch-Pagan LM test for random effect, instead, examines if individual (or time) 
specific variance components are zero and it follows a chi-squared distribution with one 
degree of freedom:  
 
If the null hypothesis is rejected, there is a significant random effect in the panel data and the 
random effect model is able to deal with heterogeneity better than the pooled OLS.  
 
Panel data models examine fixed and random effects of individual or time: the main 
difference between fixed and random models lies in the role of the dummy variables. A 
parameter estimate of a dummy variable is a part of the intercept in a fixed effect model and 
an error component in a random effect model, while slopes remain the same across groups or 
time period in either fixed or random effect model.  
 
 
The following scheme (Figure 2.1) summarizes the main differences between the two models, 
fixed and random effects, a comparison of the structural form, assumptions, intercept, error 
variances, slopes, estimation and hypothesis tests.  
 
Figure 2.1: Summary comparison between fixed and random effect models. 
 
Source: Park H. (2011), “Practical guides to panel data modeling: a step by step analysis using Stata”, Japan. 
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How to get away with heteroskedasticity 
In many cases, the extent of the dependent variable does tend to depend on one or more 
independent variables: in the presence of heteroskedasticity, the coefficient estimators are still 
unbiased, but their variance is incorrectly calculated by the normal OLS method, making 
confidence intervals and hypothesis testing incorrect as well43.  
The Breusch-Pagan heteroskedasticity test is one of the most common tests for 
heteroskedasticity: it allows the heteroskedasticity process to be a function of one or more of 
independent variables, assuming that heteroskedasticity might be a linear function of all the 
independent variables in the model. In other words, the test statistic follows a chi-square 
distribution: the null hypothesis is that the error variances are all equal, and a small chi-square 
value (with a small p-value) indicates that the null hypothesis is true, so that the variances are 
all equal. 
 
Weighted least squares (WLS) 
In the Appendix, other methods are reported: the weighted least squares, that play an 
important role in the parameter estimation for generalized linear models. In some cases, the 
errors are uncorrelated, but have unequal variance. In this case, the weighted least squares 
(WLS) is applied: a weighted sum of the squared residuals is minimized, so each squared 
residual is weighted by the reciprocal of its variance. In other words, while estimating β, less 
weight is given to the observation for which the linear relationship to be estimated is noisier, 
and more weight to those for which it is less noisy.  
 
 
3.2 The model and data specification  
In this section I describe the dataset, sources and variables used to examine the effect of the 
introduction of the BRRD on the NPLs ratio through a panel data approach.   
In order to have a good representation of the whole European banking industry, I collected 
data from the first 47 Significant Institutions, as established by the European Central Bank, 
from 2011 to 2017. I decided to stop at 2017 because in January 2018, the International 
Financial Reporting Standard 9 (IFRS 9) replaced the previous accounting standard for 
                                                 
43 One of the assumptions of the Gauss-Markov theorem is homoskedasticity, which requires that all 
observations of the dependent variable come from distributions with the same variance σ2. 
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financial instrument (IAS 39), changing, among other aspects, the approach that banks are 
required to follow in the calculation of credit losses44.  
The sample covers 17 countries of the European Union which are under the supervision of the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism and so the BRRD.   
The data was collected from the BANKSCOPE, a comprehensive commercial database of 
bank financial statements provided by Bureau van Dijk Publishing (BvD), collecting 
unconsolidated balance sheet information and double-checking these numbers by looking at 
the annual financial statements available on the bank websites. The macroeconomic variables 
are collected from different sources instead:  
• the real GDP was collected from the World Bank database; 
• the inflation rate from the Eurostat website; 
• the judicial efficiency from the Doing Business of the World Bank database.  
 
In order to avoid strong discontinuities in the balance sheet variables for banks involved in 
significant M&A transactions during the sample period, some adjustments have been made so 
as to ensure comparability over time.  
 
The dependent variable 
As dependent variable, I used the annual growth of the stock of non-performing loans, 
measured by the NPLs ratio obtained by dividing total amount of non-performing loans by 
total gross loans and then I took the first difference between time t and time t-1. The ratio of 
bank non-performing loans to total gross loans is the value of non-performing loans (gross 
value of the loan recorded on the balance sheet) divided by the total value of the loan 
portfolio. It measures the bank health and efficiency by identifying problems with asset 
quality in the loan portfolio. A high ratio might signal deterioration of the credit portfolio.  
In particular, the denominator of this ratio includes: mortgage loans, other retail loans, 
corporate and commercial loans and other loans.  
 
In this sample, the annual growth of the ratio has a mean of -0.085, denoting that the stock of 
NPLs of the most significant banks in the eurozone is slowly decreasing year after year, with 
a standard deviation of 4.653.  
                                                 
44 With the new accounting standard, provisions need to be calculated with the expected credit loss (ECL) model 
instead of an incurred loss model. IFRS 9 also requires banks to allocate financial instruments subject to ECL 
requirements in three different stages (stage 1, 2 for assets that experienced a significant increase in credit risk, 3 
for credit that are impaired) according to their credit risk level.   
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Figure 3.1: Non-performing loans in core and periphery Euro-area countries. 
 
Source: my own elaboration. 
 
Figure 3.1 tackles the evolution of the NPL ratio in my sample over 2012-2017: the sample is 
divided between Core countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands) and Periphery countries (Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Slovenia, Malta, 
Slovakia and Cyprus). So, the figure highlights that the periphery countries exhibit a higher 
ratio than the core ones, even if slowly decreasing year after year, the gap between the two 
groups is evident, highlighting the different behavior of the banks in the core countries and 
the ones in the periphery. Moreover, within the Euro area, NPLs are particularly high in 
Southern countries, notably Greece, Cyprus, Italy and Portugal. Despite the large 
discrepancies across countries and across banks, bad loans remain a problem for European 
banks, who compare unfavorably with US banks.  
 
The independent variables 
I define some bank-specific factors as independent variables to control the differences among 
banks: annual growth of total amount of gross loans, return on average equity, loan loss 
provision, Tier 1 ratio and coverage ratio. Berger and Deyoung (1997), Louzis et al (2012) 
among others are not likely to consider the determinants of NPL among macroeconomic 
factors as they are found to be exogenous to the banking industry. In fact, each bank policy 
choices, such as the emphasis on improving efficiency and the risk management, along with 
the typical features of the banking sector are expected to influence the evolution of NPLs 
(Abid et al., 2013). The relationship between NPL and bank specific factors has been 
indicated by Berger and Deyoung (1997), Louzis et al. (2012) and Sabbah (2013) who 
investigated the relationship between loan quality, cost efficiency and bank capital.   
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Furthermore, I consider some macroeconomic variables as the annual growth of real GDP, the 
annual growth of inflation rate and judicial efficiency (time and cost). Nevertheless, most of 
the literature is based on country-specific studies. For example, Salas and Saudina (2002) 
analyzed the problem loans in Spanish commercial and savings banks and found out that 
credit risk is determined by bank-specific variables, as the bank size net interest margin, 
capital ratio and market power (in addition to the real GDP). So the authors analyzed the 
causation from the real economy to non-performing loans.  
Quagliariello (2007) looked at the Italian banking sector and analyzed bank behavior over the 
business cycle, studying if loan loss provisions, NPLs and the return on assets had a cyclical 
pattern. He found that bank riskiness and profitability were affected by the evolution of the 
business cycle.   
 
Tier 1 capital ratio 
A proxy for bank capitalization is the ratio between the Tier 1 capital and the risk-weighted 
asset to get the Tier 1 ratio, with a mean of 13.3 in my sample. It is the ratio of a bank’s core 
Tier 1 capital, that is the equity capital and the disclosed reserves, divided by the total risk-
weigheted assets, that include all the assets held by the bank and systematically weighted for 
credit risk. It is considered as an important measure of a bank financial strength, adopted with 
Basel III Accord45 on bank regulation. In particular, risk-weighted assets are useful to 
determine the minimum amount of capital that must be held by the bank and other institutions 
in order to redure the risk of insolvency; it has been introduced within the Basel III Accord in 
2018. This measure aims at preventing banks from losing large amount of capital when a 
particular class of asset loses value. The minimum level of Tier 1 capital ratio increased from 
4% in Basel II to 6% (which is composed of at least 4.5% of CET1). Tier 1 capital is different 
from Tier 2 capital, which is the bank supplementary capital such as loan-loss, revaluation 
reserves and undisclosed reserves and it is less reliable or secure than Tier 1 capital.  
The formula of the Tier 1 capital ratio is:  
 
                                                 
45 Basel III is a set of international banking regulations developed by the Bank for International Settlements to 
promote stability in the international financial system and to reduce damage by banks that take too much risk. It 
aims to strengthen bank capital requirements by increasing bank liquidity and decreasing bank leverage.  
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The graph (figure 3.2) shows an increase trend over time: year after year the ratio is slowly 
increasing, reaching a higher level than in 2011.  
Figure 3.2: Tier 1 capital ratio variable over time. 
 
Source: my own elaboration. 
 
When Basel III requirements are fully implemented in 2019, banks will have to hold 
mandatory “capital conservation buffer” at 2.5% of the bank risk-weighted assets, bringing 
the total minimum CET1 ratio to 7% (4.5% plus 2.5%).   
 
Return on average equity (ROAE) 
In order to measure the profitability of the bank, I considered the return on average equity 
(ROAE): in my sample, the mean value of this variable is 7.28. ROAE differs from the 
common Return on Equity (ROE) because ROE does not accurately reflect the business’ 
actual return over a period of time: the equity value considered only includes last-minute 
stock sales, share buybacks and dividend payments. The ROAE may give a more accurate 
picture of the company’s corporate profitability, instead, especially if the shareholders’ equity 
has changed a lot during the fiscal year. So it is considered an adjusted version of the ROE. 
When the value of the shareholders’ equity does not alter or alters by a small amount during a 
specific period, the ROE and ROAE numbers should be similar.  
ROAE is driven by profitability, operating efficiency and debt, indeed this ratio also reveals 
which levers the company is pulling to achieve higher returns and if it is profitability, asset 
turnover (a measure of asset efficiency) or financial leverage (the average assets divided by 
the average stockholders’ equity and a measure of the firm’s debt level). 
It is calculated as: 
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This financial metric is expressed in the form of a percentage which is equal to net income 
after tax divided by the average shareholders’ equity for a specific period of time. The 
formula suggests how much return an entity generates for its shareholders: it helps to 
calculate how much profit the shareholders make, investing in the entity or how much money 
shareholders made for their investment in the entity.  
As displayed in figure 3.3, the ROAE variable shows a sudden decline from 2011 to 2012, 
returning to a positive sign from 2013.  
 
Figure 3.3: ROAE variable evolution over time.  
 
Source: my own elaboration. 
 
 
Loan loss provision 
Loan loss provision measures the amount set aside in the event that the loan defaults and it is 
an adjustment of loan loss reserves46, also to mitigate credit risk47. So it is a non-cash expense 
for banks to account for future losses on loan defaults, giving a guarantee on bank’s solvency 
and capitalization when default may occur. It is said to be as a “shock absorber” to offset 
probable future losses (Kendra, 2001). The loan loss provision allocated each year increases 
with the riskiness of the loans a given bank makes: a bank making a small number of risky 
loans will have a low loan loss provision compared to a bank taking higher risks. In other 
words, when banks take deposits and make loans, they must balance their loan receivables, 
                                                 
46 Loan loss reserves are balance sheet accounts that represent a bank’s best estimate of future loan losses and in 
particular it is the accumulated loan loss provisions over several years, and it is located in the balance sheet of 
lending institutions. It is calculated as: (pre-tax income + loan loss provision) / net charge-offs, where charge-off 
is a debt that is deemed unlikely to be collected by the creditor because the borrower has become substantially 
delinquent after a period of time, but this does not mean a write-off of the debt entirely. 
47 Credit risk is the risk of loss that might occur from the failure of any part, generally the failure to make 
required payments on loans. In other words, it is defined as the potential that a bank borrower will fail to meet 
the obligations in accordance with agreed terms. It is calculated based on the borrower’s overall ability to repay a 
loan according to its original terms. 
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which is the principal and the interest repayments from borrowers, with the demand for 
deposits (the request from depositors for all or a portion of their deposits). When some of 
these loans do not perform as expected, a situation of loss on the expected income for the 
bank occurs, pushing banks to set aside a portion of the expected loan repayments from all 
loans in a portfolio to cover most of the loss. This system works as an internal insurance fund, 
and it is important because it reflects a bank ability to manage its funding costs. From a 
balance sheet perspective, a loss on loans is still a loss of an asset, so loan loss provision 
secures that banks will have enough funds to distribute services to the depositors.  Loan loss 
provisions are constantly updated estimates, based on statistics for the bank customer defaults. 
The bank is presenting an accurate assessment of the financial position, by shelving loan loss 
reserves and updating estimates.  
 
When Basel I was revised, Basel II was implemented by bank supervisors across several 
countries in 2007. Under Pillar I, the determination of the minimum capital requirement for 
banks is based on three approaches: the internal risk-based (IRB) approach, the standardized 
approach and the advanced measurement (AMA) approach. The IRB approach requires banks 
to rely on their risk weights: banks should ensure that the expected losses are fully covered 
via loan loss provisions. When expected losses are greater than provisions, banks have to 
deduct the difference from capital on the basis of 50% deduction from Tier 1 capital and 50% 
from Tier 2 capital. If the expected losses are less than provisions, banks should recognize the 
difference in Tier 2 capital up to a maximum of 0.6% of risk-weighted assets.  The 
standardized approach requires banks to determine risk weights based on external credit 
ratings, instead. Banks should also include loan loss reserves up to a maximum of 1.25% risk-
weighted assets. The AMA approach requires banks to choose their own methodology for 
assessing risk provided it is exhaustively comprehensive and systemic.  
 
Overall, Basel II Pillar I tried to ensure that bank capital covers unexpected losses while loan 
loss provisions cover expected loan losses (Majnoni, Miller and Powell, 2004). 
It must be said that the distinction between loan losses covered by bank capital and loan 
losses covered by loan loss provisions is sometimes unclear because bank capital is derived 
partly from loan loss provisions (or reserves), and because general provision is included in 
Basel’s definition of bank capital (Hull, 2012). Therefore, regulatory capital requirements 
should include sufficient loan loss provisions due to the close relationship between loan loss 
provisions and capital.  
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Basel III Accord proposes the expected “through-the-cycle” loan loss provisioning system to 
be introduced in June 2018. However, the implementation was extended repeatedly to 31 
March 2019 and then again until 1 January 2022. Basel II was criticized because loan loss 
provisioning system allows provisioning only at one point in time, so only at the beginning of 
the reporting year or quarterly or semi-annually (Hull, 2012; Wezel et al., 2012). In particular, 
it introduces a loan loss provisioning system requiring banks and financial institutions to set 
aside specific provisions on newly-originated loans based on individual borrower 
characteristics that drives the performance of the loan. This implies that the level of loan loss 
provisions associated with a specific loan will be determined from the beginning based on a 
set of bank-specific and borrower-specific criteria even though the loan impairment has not 
incurred yet (Wezel et al., 2012). 
Under Basel III, banks are encouraged to improve the quality of loan loss provisions estimates 
by:  
• developing the quality of the underlying data that generates provisions buffers. This 
allows banks to eliminate flaws in current loan loss provisions models and processes, 
the imprecisions that usually generate unnecessarily high or low and insufficient 
buffers, to ensure that data quality on collateral are optimal rather than suboptimal;  
• introducing through-the-cycle loan loss provisions estimates, ensuring that the bank is 
using this approach for probability of default (PD) estimates and expected losses (EL) 
can improve the accuracy of loan loss provision estimates and decrease the volatility 
in their estimates. 
 
In this study, the mean of the annual growth of the variable is equal to 37.7, as reported in the 
summary statistics table (Figure 3.9).  
 
Figure 3.4: loan loss provision (in %) variable over time. 
 
Source: my own elaboration. 
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As shown in the relative figure 3.4, the variable suffers an intense decrease from 2011 to 
2012, increasing again two years later, with a peak in 2014, and then going down below the 
zero in 2015 and showing still a negative trend in the following years. This up-and-down 
trend may reflect the fact that in 2014 the AQR review has been made to these banks and so 
they started increasing the loan loss provisions from the end of 2013 to 2014. Furthermore, 
the decreasing trend from 2014 may be a consequence of the new regulations introduced for 
accounting purpose and of the decreasing trend of the dependent variable.  
 
Coverage ratio 
The last but not the least bank-specific variable is the coverage ratio, measured as the 
percentage of coverage of bank total loans, with a mean of 60.9 as reported in the Table 3.9 of 
summary statistics. Again, coverage ratio is a measure of the ability of the bank to absorb 
potential losses from non-performing loans and, in other words, it refers to the amount of loan 
loss provisions in relation to the corresponding gross exposure, so it is the ratio of loan loss 
reserves to impaired loans. It can be considered as a proxy to provisioning policy of a bank. 
Coverage ratios do not, per se, provide a complete picture of a bank exposure to credit risk on 
NPEs: a low coverage ratio is usually a source of concern to supervisors, as it gives an extent 
to unexpected losses, while a high ratio means that an institution is less vulnerable to future 
losses. 
 
It may be noticed that cross-country or cross-bank differences could originate from elements 
that do not suggest higher risks: for example, a low coverage level could be adequate if a 
financial institution holds a significant amount of high-quality and liquid collateral or 
coverage ratios might be lower for banks that have sold large portion of NPLs to specialized 
investors for achieving a quick reduction in NPEs48.  
The ratio between the amount of provisions and the gross NPLs is usually defined as the 
coverage ratio.   
The relative trend shown in figure 3.5 suffered a decrease during 2012-2013, then the 
coverage ratio slowly increases year after year.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 Source: European Parliament (2017), Economic Government Support. 
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Figure 3.5: Coverage ratio variable over time. 
 
Source: my own elaboration. 
 
 
According to the EBA49, the average coverage ratio of NPLs was 46% as of June 2018 (EU 
weighted average). This trend has been supported by a faster decline of NPLs than the one of 
provisions between 2017 and June 2018: higher coverage ratios give banks more room to 
reduce their non-performing loans through sales or other instruments already explained in the 
first chapter.  
 
 
Annual growth of gross loans 
Gross loan is the outstanding book value of loans that the bank has made, including non-
performing loans before the deduction of specific loan-loss provisions. In other words, this is 
an asset and is the gross value of the loan as recorded on the balance sheet. In this study, I 
considered the difference between time t and t-1 of the gross loans of the banks. As shown in 
figure 3.6, the annual growth of gross loans had a negative sign in 2011, but then sharply 
increasing and reaching the positive peak in 2013, and then slowing decreasing year after 
year.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 Source: EBA risk assessment of the European banking system as of December 2018: the EBA published its 
annual report on risks and vulnerabilities in the EU banking sector, accompanied by the results of the EBA’s EU-
wide transparency exercise, providing detailed information for 130 banks of EU, in a comparable and accessible 
format.  
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Figure 3.6: Annual growth of gross loans (in %). 
 
Source: my own elaboration. 
 
    
Judicial efficiency  
Once non-performing loans emerge, they tend to remain for a long time in bank balance sheet 
owing to another structural weakness of the countries: the length and inefficiency to resolve 
insolvency. I took two variables as a proxy of this weakness: the efficiency of the judicial 
system is measured by the days required and the cost to resolve insolvency. In particular the 
time index, provided by the World Bank database, is the number of years from the filing for 
insolvency in court until the resolution of distressed assets, while the cost of the proceedings 
is defined as the percentage of the value of the debtor's estate50. In particular, the cost is 
calculated on the basis of questionnaire responses and includes court fees and government 
taxes, fees of insolvency administrators, auctioneers, assessors and lawyers and other costs.  
 
On the opposite, the time variable captures the time for creditors to recover their credit: the 
period of time is from the company’s default until the payment of some or all of the money 
owned to the bank. In addition, potential delay tactics by the parties, as the filling of dilatory 
appeals or requests for extension are taken into consideration. In other words, this indicator 
measures the median duration that incorporation lawyers or notaries indicate is necessary in 
practice to complete a procedure with minimum follow-up with government agencies and no 
unofficial payments51 (World Bank, 2018). 
 
                                                 
50 In particular, it is a percentage of the economy’s income per capita and all official fees. 
51 It is assumed that the minimum time required for each procedure is one day. Moreover, the time that the 
entrepreneur spends on gathering information is not measured.  
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The mean number of the years needed to resolve insolvency is 1.7 and the mean of the cost (in 
%) is 10.43 (see Table 3.9). Moreover, legal uncertainties and a lengthy foreclosure process 
limit the options for restructuring influence the time necessary to recover NPLs in a country: 
as judicial efficiency decreases, the recovery time increase and so do the NPLs. It is 
reasonable to expect the efficiency of the judicial system to have a positive impact on the 
NPLs ratio.  
Therefore, judicial system efficiency is constantly mentioned as one of the main determinants 
of NPLs accumulation, Danièle Nouy (2017)52 stated “I would also like to stress that 
addressing NPLs requires determined action from all stakeholders, not only supervisors. In 
addition to our work, legal and institutional measures are required, notably in areas of 
insolvency and juridical processes” (Cerulli et al., 2017). 
 
Figure 3.7: Cost (left) in % and time (right) in year to resolve insolvency. 
              
Source: my own elaboration. 
 
Many European countries have improved the insolvency regimes in line with international 
best practice, for example Cyprus, Latvia, Poland and Romania have renewed the whole 
insolvency regime. Other countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain) have simplified 
the process, instead, and countries, like Croatia, Germany, Serbia, Italy and Spain have 
introduced improved instruments, such as debt-to-equity swaps53 or other debt-restructuring 
mechanism. Other countries, like Croatia, Germany, France, Slovenia, Spain adopted pre-
solvency procedures, or fast-track prepack insolvency procedures54 (Croatia, Greece, Italy, 
                                                 
52 Daniele Nouy was the chair of Supervisory Board at the ECB, from 2014 to 31 December 2018.  
53 A debt-to-equity swap is a transaction in which the obligations or debts of a company or individual are 
exchanged for something of value, equity. It is a refinancing agreement where a debt holder gets an equity 
position in exchange for cancellation of the debt. The swap is used to help a company in a difficult situation 
continue to operate. It is the exchange of equity for debt in order to write off money owed to creditors.  
54 Pre-pack insolvency proceedings is for example the pre-pack sale defined by the Association of Business 
Recovery Professionals in the UK as an arrangement under which the sale of part or all the company’s business 
or asset is negotiated with a purchaser prior to the appointment of an Administrator. it became a developed 
market tool to promote corporate rescue. Also, in the USA, there is a variation of the pre-pack called pre-
packaged bankruptcy.   
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Latvia, Portugal, Serbia). The result is a sudden decrease in the cost to resolve insolvency in 
the EU, while the time to resolve insolvency is now around 1,7 year (see Table 3.9). 
The insolvency regimes for corporations are generally better developed than for households, 
but deficiencies in both areas remain (IMF 2015). Moreover, an even more serious weakness 
is the slow and inconsistent implementation of insolvency laws: more than 60% of non-euro 
area countries do not set strict time limits for the insolvency process, increasing the lengthy 
proceedings. Then around 60% of the euro area countries instead has a remuneration of 
insolvency practitioners that is not linked to the outcome of the liquidation, leading to softer 
incentives for the resolution. Countries used many of the standard restructuring tools during 
2012-2014, but there is still room for improvements.  
 
Real GDP growth and inflation rate 
I focus on other two macroeconomic variables: economic growth, the inflation. To measure a 
country’s economic growth, I use the annual growth real gross GDP (gross domestic product) 
rate55, between period t and t-1: the mean is 0.7 and the standard deviation is 2.521 (see Table 
3.9). 
Then on the right Figure 3.8, the annual growth of the inflation rate is reported. According to 
the EUROSTAT definition, inflation rate is here the annual average rate of change (%), also 
called Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices (HICPs), giving a comparable measure of 
inflation as they are calculated according to the harmonized definitions56. The HICP has the 
purpose to be representative of the developments in the prices of all goods and services 
available for purchase within the euro area for the aim of directly satisfying consumer needs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.  
56 The HICP is an indicator of inflation and price stability for the ECB. It is a consumer index which is compiled 
according to a methodology that has been harmonized across EU countries. Moreover, the euro area HICP is a 
weighted average of price indices of member states who have adopted the euro. In addition, the main aim of the 
ECB is to maintain price stability, defined as keeping the year on year increase HICP below or close to 2% for 
the medium term.  
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Figure 3.8: Annual growth of real GDP (left) and inflation rate (right). 
      
Source: my own elaboration. 
 
 
Summary statistics 
The variables I just described are listed in Table 3.9, and for economic reasons I use the 
lagged value of all the independent variables, in accordance also with the literature. As data 
are collected at annual frequency, the sample of the analysis has a time dimension of six years 
and the significant banks are 47, for a total of 282 observations. In this table there is the 
summary of the descriptive statistics of all the variables considered, both dependent and 
independent ones.  
 
Table 3.9: Descriptive statistics of all the variables. 
 
Source: my own elaboration. 
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Correlation matrix 
Finally, the correlation matrix of all the variables is given in the Table 3.10: as reported, NPLs 
are negatively correlated to lagged real GDP growth and so the Tier 1 ratio, while they are 
positively related to the time to resolve insolvency and the relative cost.  
 
Table 3.10: Correlation matrix. 
 
Source: my own elaboration. 
 
Table 3.10 shows that the time to resolve insolvency has a very low correlation with the 
annual growth of real GDP, while the cost of judicial efficiency has an even lower correlation 
with the economic growth. In addition, the ROAE variable shows a positive and low 
correlation with all the other variables, including the dependent variable, with the exception of 
the cost to resolve insolvency (-0.0072).   
 
Based on the papers of the literature, I developed various testable hypothesis focusing on the 
major NPL determinants: for example, when the growth of real GPD of a country’s economy 
increases, borrowers are more able to repay their debts. Conversely, when economic growth 
slows down or becomes negative, companies and households reduce their cash flows, in turn; 
this makes it difficult for them to repay banks loans (Salas and Saurina 2002). Therefore, I 
expect real GDP growth to have a negative impact on NPLs.  
Inflation rate is an indicator of price stability instead, and it has a negative relation with the 
level of non-performing loans as shown in the correlation matrix. This is due to the fact that, 
during inflationary periods, the real value of payments of the borrower falls (Kurumi and 
Bushpepa, 2017).  
 
To sum up, in order to address my research question, I use a panel data approach with 
different specification and look at the balance sheet and macroeconomic factors affecting the 
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stock of non-performing loans of the significant banks in the Euro-area, before and after the 
introduction of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive in 2015.  So in econometric 
terms, I use a dummy variable for the BRRD year, but because of the high level of 
anticipation of this event (as we can see also from the graphical representation of all the 
relevant variables) from the Significant Institutions and the Asset Quality Review of 2014, I 
decided to use the 2014 as crucial year:  
 
 0 if t < 2014 
   Dt 
                                                1 if t ≥ 2014 
 
 
 
In econometric terms, with the use of panel data the baseline equation of this study will be:  
 
∆NPLi,t = α0  + β1· ∆grossloansi,t-1 + β2 · Tier1ratioi,t-1 + β3 · timeresinsoli,t-1 
+ β4 · costresinsoli,t-1 + β5 · ROAEi,t-1 + β6 · ∆lossprovi,t-1 + β7 · covratioi,t-1  
+ β8 · Di,t + β9 · Xi,t-1 +Ɛt   
 
Where the X is the vector of the two macroeconomic variables, that is the annual growth of 
real GDP and the inflation rate.  
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CHAPTER 4 – EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
Even if high NPL ratios do not discourage banks from lending, an exogenous variation in 
these ratios may push them to change their lending policies: in this case, NPLs do not 
constitute a drag for the credit market but their fluctuations can cause a temporary contraction 
in the supply of credit. To examine NPLs, I adopt an “event study” approach and study the 
lending dynamics around the 2014: the analysis aims at investigating the relationship between 
the European directive and the stock of non-performing loans of the banks.  
In this chapter, the results from the econometric analysis implemented in the RStudio 
software are described in detail.   
 
To better analyze the impact of the European directive on the non-performing loans ratio of 
this sample of banks, the study considers different specifications and interactions and for all 
the following tables, the estimated coefficients are reported for each variable and each model, 
whereas in parenthesis the corresponding p-value.  
 
The introduction of the European Directive by the European Central Bank with the BRRD on 
the Significant Institutions (SI) of this sample leads to a decrease of the annual growth of the 
NPL ratio of the banks: the dummy of the BRRD has a significance at 0% level. Furthermore, 
the results confirm that higher levels of judicial efficiency in one year are related to greater 
levels of NPLs in the following year. This implies that longer time periods to enforce a 
contract are related to a higher stock of non-performing loans in the following year, even if 
the result is not statistically significant in these specifications.  
 
It will be glaringly obvious that in all the models the dummy of the European Directive is 
significant and has a negative relationship with the dependent variable: from the introduction 
of this directive, the annual growth of NPL ratio of the banks has decreased, leading banks to 
hold less bad loans.  
 
The decision to use 2014 year as dummy is also driven by the econometric model estimation 
(using a dummy for the year in the fixed effect model). Indeed, running a regression with time 
fixed effects, it controls for variables that are constant across entities but vary over time. The 
model generates T-1 dummies that are included in the model, because the intercept is 
considered. This approach eliminates omitted variable bias caused by excluding unobserved 
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variables that evolve over time but are constant across entities (see Appendix for detailed 
results). The results of this analysis suggest that the critical year is 2014.  
 
Estimation results for the baseline model (column 1) without macroeconomic variables and 
the other models incorporating bank-specific variables are shown in Table 4.1.  
Specifically, in column (1), the OLS model is reported, without taking into account the two 
macroeconomic variables. 
To notice that the dependent variable is the annual growth of non-performing loans: results 
show that the relationship between the annual growth of gross loans and the dependent 
variable (annual growth of NPL ratios) is statistically significant at 1% level, with a positive 
sign.  
 
Table 4.1: OLS and pooled OLS models.  
 
Notes: ***, **, *, · denote significance at 0%, 0.1%, 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
In column (2), the lagged annual growth of real GDP and inflation rate have been added to the 
baseline model, instead: as expected, an improvement in the economic growth of the previous 
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year leads to a decline in non-performing loan ratio of banks, implying a negative effect of the 
economic environment on the stock of non-performing loans from an econometric point of 
view, as the literature has previously confirmed. The impact of the BRRD on the annual 
growth of the NPL ratio continues to be negative, even if at a lower level of significance: 
from 2014 the annual growth of non-performing loans shows a decreasing trend. This 
implication suggests that the introduction of the new instruments of the directive pushed 
banks to revise their balance sheet and reduce the amount of bad loans. 
 
In column (3), the Pooled OLS is run on the entire sample without considering the two macro-
variables: the annual growth of gross loans variable has an estimated coefficient with a 1% 
level of significance, meaning that when the banks have more loans in their balance sheet, the 
proportion of non-performing loans increases.  
 
Table 4.2: Random effect estimators and interactions. 
 
Notes: ***, **, *, · denote significance at 0%, 0.1%, 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.2 shows the estimated coefficients of the Random Effect estimator in different 
specifications:  
• Without the macro-variables (column 4); 
• With the annual growth of GDP and inflation rate variables (column 5); 
• The interaction of the Tier1 ratio variable with the dummy of BRRD (column 6); 
• The interaction of loan loss provision variable with the dummy of BRRD (column 7). 
 
So quite consistent with the literature of the first chapter, all models show a significant and 
negative relationship between the lagged real GDP and the annual growth of NPLs. In other 
words, the improvement in the real economy is generating a reduction in the annual growth of 
non-performing loan portfolios of the most relevant European banks, being the GDP growth 
one of the main drivers of non-performing loans at macro level. On the contrary, the annual 
growth of gross loans has a positive relation with the annual growth of the stock of non-
performing loans in all the models as in the previous table.   
 
The lagged coverage ratio variable has no significance in neither model instead, exhibiting a 
positive sign in all the estimations. In principle a low coverage ratio does not necessarily 
imply a risk of under-provisioning, since it may reflect rigorous lending practices or a strong 
insolvency framework (where for example repossession is easy for creditors). Nevertheless, in 
countries with weak legal framework and judicial efficiency, a low coverage ratio may 
suggest a potential source of instability. This situation can dampen credit supply especially in 
crisis years, when negative shocks further affect the credit quality of borrowers. Consistently, 
we consider a low coverage ratio as a symptom of under-provisioning or delay in the 
recognition of losses (Beatty and Liao 2011).   
Many actions have been taken in Europe in the last years in order to increase the coverage 
ratio of non-performing loans and so to favor the resolution of the NPL problem.  
 
Looking at column (6) of Table 4.2, the interaction between the Tier 1 ratio variable and the 
dummy of the Directive is significant at the level of 0% and positive, meaning that from 2014 
to 2017 the Directive had a positive impact on the banks’ financial strength. On the opposite, 
the lagged Tier 1 ratio variable has a negative and significant estimated coefficient at a level 
of 5%: the role of capitalization is associated to a higher level of NPL ratio in all the other 
model with the exception of this particular case. The dummy is still highly and negatively 
significant: the increasing supervision of the ECB from 2014 led to a decreasing level of 
NPLs in the balance sheet of the supervised banks in the Euro area.  
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Moreover, the interaction in column (7) of Table 4.2 suggests that a positive and significant 
correlation exists between the dummy on European Directive and the lagged loan loss 
provision variable: from 2014 Significant Institutions (SI) hold less risky loans and therefore 
also less provisions. Bank loan loss provisions continue to receive much attention from bank 
regulators because the volume of loan in the balance sheet of the banks makes banks 
vulnerable to loan default arising from deteriorating economic conditions which affects 
borrowers’ ability to repay (Leaven and Majnoni, 2013). Also due to the fact that loan loss 
provisions are usually procyclical and could worsen an existing recession if not anticipated, as 
evident from 2008 global financial crisis, leading to an increase of loan loss provisions and so 
eroding bank profit (Ozili and Outa, 2017).  
This is also confirmed by the positive and significance of the loan loss provision variable: it 
increases with the riskiness of the loans a given bank makes, so a small number of risky loans 
implies a low value of loss provision.  
The negative and significant relationship of the BRRD with the NPL ratio is confirmed 
together with the positive significance of the annual growth of gross loans at 0% and 5%, 
respectively.  
 
The relationship between the time to resolve insolvency and the annual growth of the NPL 
ratio is positive in all the estimations: an increase in the years for the resolution of distressed 
assets leads to an increase of NPL ratios in the balance sheet of these European banks, 
meaning that in countries with low juridical efficiency the NPL ratio is high.  
 
Analyzing the ROAE variable, the lagged value of the variable is positive and not significant 
in all estimations: even if it is expected to be negative, it is not easy to predict the relationship 
between this variable and the NPL ratio. In this case, an increase of investments made which 
could turn out to be non-performing, then a positive relationship with the annual growth of 
NPL can be detected.  
 
Inflation rate, instead, shows a negative but not significant relationship with the dependent 
variable, even if it should be expected to positively affect the NPL ratio. Inflation rate is 
treated as a relevant macro-economic determinant of NPLs because it is an indicator of 
economic instability. The rise in inflation decreases the purchasing power of money and the 
real value of an income, which weakens the debt servicing and hence increases the NPL level. 
Actually, during the time-span I consider, the inflation rate of the European countries does not 
suffer high changes, so I might suppose that it is not a relevant macro-economic variable in 
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this study: higher inflation made debt servicing easier by reducing the real value of the unpaid 
loan that caused low NPL level.   
 
4.1 Diagnostic tests 
Multicollinearity test 
Running the multivariate multicollinearity test, called Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), it can 
accept the introduction of these control variables together only if the thresholds VIF values 
are respected57. The variance inflation for a variable is computed as: 
 
VIFs are calculated by taking a predictor and regressing it against the other predictors in the 
model. The result is the R-squared values to be plugged in the VIF formula.  
The VIF estimates how much the variance of a regression coefficient is inflated due to 
multicollinearity in the model. So the result of the tests I conducted show the absence of a 
multivariate multicollinearity problem: all VIF values are identified less than 4, the threshold 
cited by Fox (1991), as reported in the Appendix. The numerical value for VIF, in decimal 
form, reports what percentage the variance is inflated for each coefficient.  
 
Hausman test  
To get the most appropriate model, the Hausman Test is used to choose between the random 
effect and the fixed effect model. The p-value results equal to 0.3171, suggesting that the 
random effect estimator is preferred, so this is the reason why I dropped to report the 
estimated coefficients of FE in the previous tables58.  
 
Breush-Pagan test  
Heteroskedasticity is a major concern in linear regression models, because it is the violation 
of the assumption that the model residuals have a constant variance and are uncorrelated, as 
explained in the previous chapter.   
Running the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity, the p-value is less than 2.2e-16, 
detecting heteroskedasticity (see Appendix for details). Therefore there are two possible ways 
                                                 
57 Multicollinearity is when there is a correlation between predictors, that are the independent variables, in a 
model. Its presence can adversely affect the regression results.   
58 See Appendix for numerical details.  
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to correct heteroskedasticity. The first one is using the robust covariance matrix to account for 
it in the previous models, a technique to obtain unbiased standard errors of OLS coefficients. 
The second solution is the introduction of the Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) 
estimator, but it is anachronistic today and it is not appropriate when Fixed Effect is not 
consistent, as in this case.  
  
4.2 Heteroskedasticity correction: robust standard error  
I used the first alternative using the robust standard errors and computing again the main 
models, with macro-economic variables and interactions between explanatory variables: the 
results will not be too far from the previous ones. The following Table 4.3 shows the 
estimated coefficients and the p-values in parenthesis of the different estimations.  
 
Table 4.3: Corrected OLS and Pooled OLS estimator. 
 
Notes: ***, **, *, · denote significance at 0%, 0.1%, 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
In the column (1) of table 4.3, the OLS model with corrected-heteroskedasticity standard 
errors leads to a high significance of the European Directive with a negative sign as in the 
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previous estimation. In this case, I used the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
(HAC) standard errors, or simply Newey-West standard errors59.  
Even adding the two macro-variables (column 2), the significance of the variables is similar to 
the previous estimation: the BRRD is again significant and the lagged value of the growth of 
real GDP too, at 0.1% and 1% respectively.  
 
Moreover, in the Pooled OLS estimator (column 3), the only two significant variables are the 
same as in the first models with heteroskedasticity: annual growth of gross loans with a 5% 
level of significance and the BRRD dummy at 0.1% level.  
 
Table 4.4: Random effect estimator and interactions. 
 
Notes: ***, **, *, · denote significance at 0%, 0.1%, 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
                                                 
59 Newey and West (1987) have proposed a more general covariance estimator that is robust to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the residuals of unknown form.  
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Again, as Table 4.4 shows, the results are almost in line with the previous analysis: in all 
these models the value of the lagged real GDP has a negative impact on the annual growth of 
the NPL ratio when we control for the macro-economic variables.  
 
Again, the annual growth of gross loans has a positive and a 10% level of significance in all 
the specifications except for the OLS model, that is the positive impact between the annual 
growth of NPL ratio and the annual growth of gross loans of these banks. The macro-
economic factors have a negative impact on non-performing loans, and this is in line with the 
literature shown in chapter 1.    
 
In column (7) when I introduce an interaction between the BRRD dummy and the loan loss 
provisions, this variable is no longer significant, while the BRRD dummy is still at 0.1% level 
of significance and the annual growth of gross loans has a 10% level of significance as 
already shown. To notice that the inflation rate variable is significant for the first time with a 
significance level of 0.1% and with a negative sign: inflation rate has -0.055 points negative 
relationship with NPL considering other factors constant.  
The lagged value of the return on average equity variable is not statistically significant in all 
models, having a positive relation with the dependent variable and meaning that an increase of 
ROAE leads to an increase in the stock of non-performing loans of the banks.  
Finally, the coverage ratio has the same positive sign without any significance in these 
models.   
 
In conclusion, it looks like the only relevant bank-specific variables are the annual growth of 
gross loans in the balance sheet of the European significant institutions, while the only macro-
economic driver is the lagged growth of real GDP. This implies that the economic 
environment has some effect on the quality of the balance sheet of the supervised entities in 
the euro area.  
 
4.3 Clustered standard errors  
The importance of using cluster-robust variance estimators (i.e., “clustered standard errors”) 
in panel models is now widely recognized. Clustered standard errors account for situations 
where observations within each group are not i.i.d. (independently and identically distributed), 
and they might be thought as a generalization of White's heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors. While White standard errors allow elements on the diagonal of the covariance matrix 
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to be different, clustered standard errors allow the covariance matrix to be block-diagonal. 
Thus, clustered standard errors allow for heteroscedasticity and correlation in the error term 
within a cluster. What matters is that both White and clustered standard errors are asymptotic 
results. 
 
Trying to cluster over time and over group (in my case, over banks) in both the Pooled OLS 
and the RE estimator, I end up with the results that are not too far from the previous ones, 
confirming the sign and the significance of the growth of gross loans and the European 
directive, as we can see in the following tables (Table 4.5 and 4.6).  
 
Table 4.5: Clustered standard errors of Pooled OLS over time and over group. 
 
Notes: ***, **, *, · denote significance at 0%, 0.1%, 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 4.5 reports the estimated coefficients and the corresponding p-values of the pooled OLS 
model estimated with clustered standard errors over time (in the first part of the table) and 
over banks (the second part of the table). Both estimations do not take into account the two 
macroeconomic variables (the real GDP and inflation rate). Again, the significance of the 
European directive is confirmed: from 2014, the annual growth of non-performing loans has 
decreased.  
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Table 4.6: Clustered standard errors of RE estimator over time and over group. 
 
Notes: ***, **, *, · denote significance at 0%, 0.1%, 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
In table 4.6 the random effect estimator with clustered standard errors is presented. In the 
upper part of the table, estimated coefficients and corresponding p-values are clustered over 
banks, while on the lower part they are clustered over time. Both estimations lead to similar 
results, confirming the effect of the introduction of the BRRD on the annual growht on NPL 
ratio.  
 
The time to resolve insolvency, the return on average equity, coverage ratio and the Tier 1 
ratio have a positive relationship with the annual growth of the NPL ratio in both Pooled OLS 
and RE estimators. On the contrary, loan loss provision, cost to resolve insolvency and BRRD 
have a negative correlation with non-performing loans. In this specification, I did not take into 
consideration the annual growth of real GDP and inflation rate.   
To conclude, also this method confirms the evidences I found in the previous econometric 
approach. 
 
Overall, the annual growth of real GDP affects the stock of non-performing loans in all the 
specifications, following the literature, meaning that in my model and dataset, this macro-
economic variable is relevant. Regarding the bank-specific variables, it seems that only the 
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annual growth of gross loans has a positive relationship with the annual growth of non-
performing loans of the banks I took into consideration.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
The problem of non-performing loans is very complex. One of the fastest resolution methods 
available to banks is the direct sale or securitization of these activities on the market. 
Exploring the determinants of the credit risk, taking the form of non-performing loans, is an 
issue of substantial importance for regolatory authorities. This NPL issue affects financial 
stability and also bank management. 
  
The European NPL problem has reached dramatic proportions as Bruno, Lusignani and 
Onado (2017) stress and it is delaying economic recovery. A Euroepan solution or, rather, a 
combination of resolution tools and strategies has to be carried out in order to face this 
challenge.  
 
Regulatory initiatives at the international and EU levels are essential in establishing a sound 
and robust framework for financial institutions, markets and infrastructures. Moreover, 
strenghtening the regulatory framework for non-bank financial intermediation is crucial in 
order to limit regulatory arbitrage and improve the resilience of the entire financial system 
(Financial Stability Review, 2019).  
 
This study addresses a key policy relevant question, that is if the introduction of the BRRD 
had an effect on the stock of non-performing of the supervised entities by the ECB. The 
sample is composed of banks (currently labeled as “significant” under the SSM) in countries 
in the Euro area between 2011 and 2017.  
 
From my econometric analysis, I conclude that there is no room for doubt about the reaction 
of the most relevant banks to the introduction of accurate supervision from the European 
authorities. From 2014 the annual growth of non-performing loan ratio has slowly decraeased, 
leading in 2019 the ECB to revise the expectations for prudential provisionings and relaxing 
the time for NPL flow. The study I carried out suggests that the statistically significant 
macroeconomic variable is the annual growth of real GDP, as widely analysed by the 
literature. To notice that in this timespan the inflation does not suffer unexpected fluctuations.  
From an econometric point of view, I had to correct for heteroskedasticity with the 
introduction of robust standard errors. Moreover, with the use of the clustered standard errors 
of the random effect and pooled OLS models over banks and time, I tried to examine in depth 
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the relation between the dependent variable and the independent ones. The results confirm the 
previous evidence and highlight the statistically significance of the European directive.  
Finally, the analysis suggests that with the introduction of the new instruments in the 
directive, the supervised banks are reducing the stok of bad loans, improving the quality of the 
balance sheet.   
 
Regarding the August 2019 news, the European Central Bank did a press release stating that 
supervisory expectations for prudential provisioning for new NPLs have been revised, but the 
supervisory expectations for coverage of stock of NPLs did not change. This situation is due 
to the fact that at the start of the ECB Banking Supervision in November 2014, the volume of 
NPLs held by the Significant Institutions stood around 1 euro trillion, but by the end of March 
2019, the volume has fallen almost by the half (NPL ratio at 3.7%).  
It is reasonable for regulatory authorites and supervisors to closely monitor the evolution of 
non-performing loans, but with industry profitability at historic lows and the emergence of 
new digital competitors in the market, it is essential that regulation and supervision strike a 
balance in such a way that regulation preserves fianacial stability without causing an adverse 
effect on the sector’s ability to make a profit.  
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APPENDIX 
A) Hausman test:  
 
 
 
The Hausman test suggests that there is strong evidence in favour of the random effect 
estimation. This means that there is no correlation between the unique errors and the 
regressors.  
 
 
B) Time dummy fixed effect model results:  
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C) Random model with interaction results: 
 
 
 
 
 
D) Weighted least squares 
Weighted Least Squares (WLS) attempts to provide a more efficient alternative to OLS. It is a 
special version of the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimator. Instead of the sum 
of squared residuals, their weighted sum is minimized. If the weights are inversely 
proportional to the variance, the estimator is efficient. Also, the usual formula for the 
variance-covariance matrix of the parameter estimates and standard inference tools are valid. 
We can obtain WLS parameter estimates by multiplying each variable in the model with the 
square root of the weight, in R there is a more concise syntax and it takes care of correct 
residuals, fitted values, predictions, and the like in terms of the original variables.  
Typically, we don’t know the variance function and have to estimate it. This feasible GLS 
(FGLS) estimator replaces the (allegedly) known variance function with an estimated one.  
The results are reported in the following Table.  
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E) VIF results:  
 
 
 
 
 
F) Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity:  
 
 
